



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
UNITED STATES ARMY INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY COMMAND
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION/PRIVACY OFFICE
FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755-5995

May 2, 2001

Freedom of Information/
Privacy Office

2001-10103W
1-166

Mr. John Young
CRYPTOME
251 West 89th Street
Suite 6E
New York, New York 10024

Dear Mr. Young:

This responds to your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request of March 29, 2001, for records concerning various dossiers. Your request was received in this office on April 18, 2001.

We have conducted checks of the automated Defense Clearance and Investigations Index and a search of the Investigative Records Repository to determine the existence of Army intelligence investigative records responsive to Hungary Operational Information, ZF010103W.

We have completed a mandatory declassification review in accordance with Executive Order (EO) 12958. As a result of this review information has been sanitized from these records as it is currently and properly classified CONFIDENTIAL according to Sections 1.3(a)(3) and 3.4(b)(1) of EO 12958. This information is exempt from the public disclosure provisions of the FOIA pursuant to Title 5 U.S. Code 552 (b)(1). Fees for processing this request are waived. A brief explanation of the applicable sections follows:

Section 1.3(a)(3) of EO 12958 provides that information shall be classified CONFIDENTIAL if its unauthorized disclosure reasonably could be expected to cause damage to the national security.

Section 3.4(b)(1) of EO 12958 provides that information more than 25 years old is exempt from automatic declassification if it would reveal the identity of a confidential human source, or reveal information about the application of an intelligence source or methods or reveal the identity of human intelligence source when the unauthorized disclosure of that source would clearly and demonstrably damage the national security interests of the United States.

Since the release of some of the information deleted from the records would result in an unwarranted invasion of the privacy rights of the individuals concerned, this information is exempt from the public disclosure provisions of the FOIA per Title 5 U.S. Code 552 (b) (7) (C).

In addition, since the release of the information in the records would reveal the identity of confidential sources, it is exempt from public disclosure pursuant to Title 5 U.S. Code 552 (b) (7) (D) of the FOIA. The significant and legitimate governmental purpose to be served by withholding is that a viable and effective intelligence investigative capability is dependent upon protection of confidential sources.

The withholding of information by this office is a partial denial of your request. This denial is made on behalf of Brigadier General Keith B. Alexander, the Commanding General, U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command, who is the Initial Denial Authority for Army intelligence investigative and security records under the FOIA. You may appeal this decision to the Secretary of the Army. If you wish to file an appeal, you should forward it to this office. Your appeal must be postmarked no later than 60 calendar days from the date of this letter. After the 60 day period, the case may be considered closed; however, such closure does not preclude you filing litigation in the courts.

We have been informed by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) that eight pages are withheld from public disclosure pursuant to Title 5 U.S. Code 552 (b) (1) and (b) (3) of the FOIA. It is not possible to reasonably segregate meaningful portions of the withheld pages for release.

The withholding of the information by the CIA constitutes a denial of your request and you have the right to appeal this decision to the Agency Review Panel within 45 days from the date of this letter. If you decide to file an appeal, it should be forwarded to the following: Ms. Kathryn I. Dyer, Information and Privacy Coordinator, Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, DC 20505. Please explain the basis of your appeal. Cite CIA #F-2000-00424 assigned to your request so that it may be easily identified.

During the processing of your request, information was disclosed which is under the purview of another government agency. This office has no authority to release the record and it is being referred, along with your request, for appropriate action under the FOIA, and direct reply to you.

We are continuing to review other titles you have requested and will respond to you by separate correspondence when our review is complete.

If you have any questions concerning this action, feel free to contact Mrs. Reilly at (301) 677-4742. Please refer case 634F-01.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Russell A. Nichols".

Russell A. Nichols
Chief, Freedom of Information/
Privacy Office

Enclosure

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DOSSIER NO.

2F010103W

As of 4/27/79 all material
(Date)

included in this file conforms with

DA policies currently in effect.

DAISY STEVENSON 4/27/79
(Signature) (Date Signed)

(Printed Name) (Grade)

RECEIVED mubur 10 Dec 79

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USAREUR INTELLIGENCE REPORT

ATTN Intelligence Division BRANCH Production SECTION _____

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
UNIT	REPORT NUMBER	REFERENCE	PROJECT NUMBER	SOURCE NR. & EVAL	DATE OF INFO	DATE OF REPORT	COUNTRY
7	MU 412	D10d(4)(SA)			110162	240162	24

9. SUBJECT Operational Information, Hungary

10. FORWARDED BY _____ 11. TELEPHONE SM 8469

12. INCLOSURES: None

~~WARNING: SOURCE - SENSITIVE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED~~

13. REPORT: (Remarks)

(21) Source, who was a commercial legal traveler to Hungary during the period 20 November to 20 December 1961, furnished the following information:

1. Internal travel and controls:

a. Border controls: Source traveled to Hungary by air from Amsterdam, Netherlands, via KLM and landed at the Budapest airport, Budapest (CT5276), Hungary. Normal customs and border procedures were accomplished in the airport, and Source was able to leave the airport for Budapest within an hour after arrival. Passports and visas were checked cursorily and customs declarations were filed. For the first time Source was asked to list personal jewelry upon entry into Hungary. Source departed Budapest and returned to West Germany by POV on 20 December 1961. Passports and currency declarations were checked. No search was made.

b. Internal controls:

(1) On the evening of 13 December 1961 Source was seated in a small cafe on the north side of Bartok Bela Uton at the west end of Morisz Szigmond Korter in Budapest, when two men in civilian attire wearing long brown leather overcoats entered the cafe and started to ask patrons for their identification papers. Of a total of approximately 15 patrons, approximately 11 were asked for their papers and were directed to leave the cafe. Three uniformed Hungarian soldiers were among these persons. Within 20 minutes after the two men in leather coats left the cafe, the remaining patrons paid their bills and the cafe was deserted. Source was not asked for identification papers. Source saw no other unusual activity while in Budapest.

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REPORT NUMBER: NU 412

SOURCE: L

(2) Source, while proceeding west on Route #1 at 1845 hours, 20 December 1961, in an automobile bearing West German license plates, was flagged down by a Hungarian soldier, rank unknown, using a flashlight to signal vehicle to halt. When the guard noticed the West German license plate, the vehicle was waved on without coming to a complete halt. This action occurred on the eastern outskirts of Nagyvesztelek (XP5821), Hungary. Two soldiers were operating this check point and were armed with sub-machine guns resembling PPSh 41. Due to darkness, Source could not identify any rank or branch insignia.

(3) Hungarian citizens receiving monetary gifts from friends or relatives residing in foreign lands must purchase IKKA bonds at the Hungarian National Bank. The Hungarians may then go to the IKKA department store and purchase Hungarian-made export items with these bonds. No foreign products are sold by IKKA and all purchases must be made with IKKA bonds. There are always people in front of the IKKA store who attempt to buy items at black market prices from patrons of the IKKA store. Source has been approached on numerous occasions by persons offering to buy clothing, especially shoes.

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USAREUR INTELLIGENCE REPORT

ATTN Intelligence Division BRANCH Production SECTION _____

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
UNIT	REPORT NUMBER	REFERENCE	PROJECT NUMBER	SOURCE NR. & EVAL	DATE OF INFO	DATE OF REPORT	COUNTRY
7	WG-512	ICD-10d(4) DALRIE I-4			220162		24

a. SUBJECT Internal Travel and Controls in Soviet Colonial Empire

10. FORWARDED BY L 11. TELEPHONE RM 8469

12. INCLOSURES:

~~WARNING NOTICE SENSITIVE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED~~

13. REPORT (Remarks)

(C) Operational Information: Hungarian controls and travel restrictions placed on West German crews aboard river vessels passing through Hungary:

1. The carrying of cameras aboard vessels traveling to and/or through Hungary is forbidden. Persons violating this order will have their camera(s) confiscated and will be heavily penalized. This order, Circular No. 3/62, dated 12 January 1962, was published by the Bayerischer Lloyd Shipping Company, Inc., and a copy of this order was given to all vessel captains and tanker-barge helmsmen employed by this firm.

2. West German crew members aboard Danube River vessels are now permitted to leave their moored vessels for a period of two (2) hours. They are required to reboard their vessel within the specified two (2) hour time limit. The former regulation permitting unrestricted travel within a twenty (20) kilometer radius of the moored vessel is no longer valid. No further information available.

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USAREUR INTELLIGENCE REPORT

ATTN Intelligence Division BRANCH Production SECTION

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
UNIT	REPORT NUMBER	REFERENCE	PROJECT NUMBER	SOURCE NR. & EVAL	DATE OF INFO	DATE OF REPORT	COUNTRY
7	MU-302	D-10d(3)(4)(SA) DALRIR I-4			110162	220162	24

9. SUBJECT Operational Information, Hungary

10. FORWARDED BY

11. TELEPHONE SM 8469

12. INCLOSURES: None

13. REPORT: (Remarks) ~~WARNING NOTICE SENSITIVE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED~~

(u) (C) Hungarian Border Control, Hegyeshalom (XP6109), Hungary. Source stated that he crossed the border during the early morning hours of 24 November 1961, while enroute to Budapest, in his 1958 Ford Coupe. When stopped at the control point, he was asked only to declare what monies he was bringing into the country and after one of the two persons on the point made a record of this, he was waved on by a salute from the guard. Source stated that the two guards on the check point appeared very young.

Source stated that Highway 1 was very muddy due to recent rains and that farmers carried mud from their side routes and fields onto the main highway. Source was displeased because his car became very dirty after aprx one-half hour.

Source stated that while attending conferences in Budapest, he and his friend were always in the presence of two interpreters who continually made a nuisance of themselves, and Source was not able to discuss all the items he would normally feel free to do. On the evening of 24 November 1961, Source and friend picked up two women in the hotel and proceeded to an inn south of Budapest on Route 7. Meaning to remain at the inn with the women overnight, Source was refused quarters as he had had to leave his papers behind in Budapest at the hotel. After one hour, Source and friends returned to Budapest. One woman's name was LILLI, fnu.

Source stated that while driving north from Budapest, during the evening hours of 25 November 1961, he saw two watchtowers similar to those found in border areas. Although it was nighttime and fairly foggy, Source stated that he could see personnel in the nearest tower. Nationality or uniforms could not be determined. Source stated that first tower was seen in vicinity of TAHITOTFALU (CT574905) and second was detected across the river from DUNABOGDANY (CT528955).

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AGL (1) 11-66-24M-70852

FORM
AE 20 NOV 59 3197

REPLACES AE FORMS 519 AND 519A, 2095, 2262, AND 2263 AND 2263-1, WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

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Report Number: MU-302

(continued)

Source:

Source stated that the majority of Hungarians observed appeared poor, not well dressed, according to Western standards, and several persons engaged in conversation with Source were hesitant and sometimes fearful of talking with a person from the West.

Hungarian Border Controls, HEGYESHALOM. While leaving Hungary on the morning of 26 November 1961, Source was stopped at this check point. Two people were on duty at the control point. Source was made to account for his money that had been recorded when he arrived in Hungary. Guards had him open his suitcase but made only a very cursory examination, not even touching articles within the suitcase. Source was then waved on. Complete operation did not last more than 15 minutes. Source stated that on a previous trip he took the train from Budapest to Vienna, and the train was halted for an hour while guards in overalls checked the entire train including undercarriages.

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5 USC 552 (b) (1)

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USAREUR INTELLIGENCE REPORT

ATTN Intelligence Division BRANCH Production SECTION

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
UNIT	REPORT NUMBER	REFERENCE	PROJECT NUMBER	SOURCE NR. & EVAL	DATE OF INFO	DATE OF REPORT	COUNTRY
7	WG-342	ICD-10d (4) DALRIR I-4			121261	220162	24

9. SUBJECT Operational Information: Danube River Controls

10. FORWARDED BY L 11. TELEPHONE SM 8469

12. INCLOSURES:

~~WARNING NOTICE - SENSITIVE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED~~

13. REPORT: (Remarks)

1. Danube River traffic from West Germany to Ismail, USSR: Internal Travel, Controls and Smuggling Activities pertaining to Danube River Seamen:

a. Smuggling: Smuggling is a widespread activity among Danube River seamen. Jewelry and items made of gold, such as wrist watches and cufflinks, are purchased in West Germany and Austria and resold by the seamen in the Bloc countries. Common MO employed by the seamen is to conceal the items of contraband in inner tubes or structural parts of bicycles, motor scooters or similar type vehicles which they carry with them aboard their vessels or barges. Wines and liquors are smuggled into the GFR on the return trip by concealing the bottles in the bilges of their ships and barges.

b. Internal Travel and Controls of GFR seamen on the Danube: Travel in all the Bloc countries by GFR seamen on the Danube River does not require any documentation or passes other than the seaman's identity card which must be carried on the person at all times. Other applicable regulations, in the countries indicated, are as follows:

(1) Hungary and Bulgaria: Unrestricted travel permitted within a twenty (20) kilometer radius of the seaman's vessel.

(2) Yugoslavia and USSR: Unrestricted travel.

(3) Romania: Crew members departing their ship must strip off all outer clothing, including socks and shoes, which are then thoroughly examined. After the seaman has passed the search control, he is permitted to travel within a ten (10) kilometer radius of his ship.

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USAREUR INTELLIGENCE REPORT

ATTN Intelligence Division BRANCH Production SECTION _____

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
UNIT	REPORT NUMBER	REFERENCE	PROJECT NUMBER	SOURCE NR. & EVAL	DATE OF INFO	DATE OF REPORT	COUNTRY
7	MU-502	D-10d(4) DALRIR I-4			170162		24

9. SUBJECT Operational Information, Hungary

10. FORWARDED BY _____

11. TELEPHONE SM 8469

12. INCLOSURES: None

13. REPORT: (Remarks) ~~WARNING NOTICE SENSITIVE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED~~

(W) Source (who had not been contacted prior to the time of the trip to Hungary) traveled by POV to Hungary during the period 1-10 September 1961, and furnished the following information:

a. Customs control entry: Source arrived at Hegyeshalom (XP6109), Hungary, at aprx 1730 hours, 1 September 1961, in his POV, a 1960 VW Camper, accompanied by his wife and two children. At the border check point, the passports of the passengers were checked by a uniformed person. Another uniformed person made a cursory inspection of the vehicle plus the contents of one of the suitcases. Source was asked whether any Hungarian Forints (HF), cameras or radios were in his possession. Source had a camera which was declared and converted DMW into HF at this time. A personal inspection was not performed and after about a fifteen-minute delay, Source and family were allowed to depart.

b. Customs control exit: On the return journey, Source arrived at Hegyeshalom border check point at aprx 1130 hours, 10 September 1961. At this time his passport and the passports of his family were checked, stamped and returned. A cursory inspection was made of the vehicle and luggage. Source and family departed the check point without incident.

c. Internal controls: At aprx 2100 hours, Source and family arrived in Budapest (CT5561) at the home of his aunt. Source wanted to register with the police upon his arrival in the city. However, his aunt informed him that it was unnecessary. Aprx three days later, Source was informed to report to the police station in Budapest. At the police station, Source was asked why he did not register with the police. Source replied that his aunt had checked with the housemeister of the building where they were living and was informed that it was not necessary. The police informed him that it is mandatory to register

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AGL (1) 12-88-MM-74052

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Report Number: MU-502

(continued)

upon arrival in any city when remaining overnight. Source completed certain forms and at the completion of the forms was told that for failure to register, there is a fine of 140 HF. Source paid the fine and was informed by the police not to forget to register the next time, or there will be a heavier fine imposed at the next violation.

d. Information pertaining to the purchase of gasoline: Source learned that in order for a person to make gasoline purchases, he must first obtain gas coupons at one of the post offices within Hungary. Source also learned that gasoline stations within Hungary receive a monthly quota and once that quota is exhausted, the owner will not receive more until the following month.

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5 USC 552 (b) (1)

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HE-5004W/B

HEADQUARTERS
COLLECTION AND DISSEMINATION BATTALION
513TH INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP
APO 757 US FORCES

AEUMF (SF)
(MI-3758-61)

12 November 1961

IMPERSONAL SUBJECTS CARRIED INIT. *(u)*
SUBJECT: Unusual Defection from Hungary to West Germany *(e)* *(u)*

TO: Liaison Officer
66th IC Group
w/513th IC Group
APO 757, US Forces

1. (U) Reference

Reference is made to D-10d(4)(SA) and D-10d(8)(CI).

2. *(u)* Source

Date of Information: August 1961

• Evaluation: F-6

CARRIED

• Unable to study medicine in Hungary, allegedly because of her family background, Source decided to defect to the West, hoping to be able to take up medical studies there.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ON 11 Jan 99
BY CDR USAINSCOM F01/PO
AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1R

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DOD DIR 5200.10

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5 USC 552a (b) (7) (D)

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AEUMF (SP)

14 November 1961

(MI-3758-61)

SUBJECT: Unusual Defection from Hungary to West Germany (C)(u)

3. (C) Report

a. Application for Passport

In [] Source applied for a passport to Denmark. As a reason for this request, she indicated her desire to visit her friends in COPENHAGEN, whom she knew since 1947, and with whom she corresponded since that date. (In []

Source's application for passport was accompanied with the following papers:

- (1) Personal history statement
- (2) Letter of approval from her employer
- (3) Letter of approval from the []
- (4) Letter of invitation from the Danish family, containing a statement that they will bear all necessary expense
- (5) A statement that she will not request any monetary assistance from the Hungarian Government while in Denmark; that she will not associate with Hungarian defectors there; and that she will behave as not to bring any discredit upon the Hungarian People's Democracy.
- (6) Four passport pictures, stamped by the local police department, and 360 Forint (Hungarian currency).

Source handcarried all of the above documents to the Passport Section, Ministry of Interior in BUDAPEST. In [] she was notified by mail that her application was rejected, however, that she may appeal within 30 days, if she desired to do so. (The application, with all inclosures, were retained at the Ministry). In [] Source appealed for the passport to Denmark, and her appeal was again rejected. She was notified about the rejection in []. Within the same month [] Source appealed again. In [] Source received a registered letter from the Ministry of Interior, which contained her passport and a letter of instructions. The letter advised her to surrender her identity document (azonossagi igazolvány) at the [] prior to her departure. She also had to sign this

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5 USC 552a (b) (7) (C)
5 USC 552a (b) (7) (D)

SUBJECT: Unusual Defection from Hungary to West Germany (C)(U)

letter, and later left the letter with Hungarian Border Officials, while enroute to Austria.

b. Receipt of Passport

CARDED Source has no explanation for the sudden approval of her application; however, she states that in [redacted] she made an acquaintance with a [redacted]

[redacted] where she was employed. [redacted] stated that he was formerly employed at the Ministry of Foreign Commerce, and that he might be able to help her to get the passport since he has some friends at the Ministry of Interior. Source does not know whether he intervened on her behalf; however, she recalls telling him about her difficulties shortly before she received the passport. [redacted] offered her US dollars, which he failed to acquire. She states that [redacted] did not require anything from her in return.

Having the passport, Source went to the Danish Embassy in BUDAPEST and applied for a visa, which she received on [redacted] She also applied for Austrian, E. German, Swiss, and W. German transit visas (W. German transit visa was obtained through the French Embassy). Source received all of the transit visas except for the Swiss one, which was at first rejected; however, it was forwarded to her while she was in COPENHAGEN.

c. Trip to BRATISLAVA, CSSR

In [redacted] Source spent a three-day vacation in BRATISLAVA, CSSR. She states that she wanted to see BRATISLAVA city once more, prior to her departure, claims to have had no other reasons. While in BRATISLAVA, she stayed at a hotel, claims not to have contacted there anyone.

Source states that for this trip, she did not need any documentation other than her Identity Card. She states that since about Jan 61, Hungary, CSSR and Rumania have an agreement, pertaining to travel within those countries without a passport. All that is necessary is the ordinary ID Card, to which is attached an insert, called "Utlevel Lap" (passport page). The passport page may be obtained by any citizen of the above countries at travel agencies; in the case of Hungary, at the IBUSZ. While traveling with this passport insert, the following limitations apply:

(1) Maximum amount of money allowed, 500 forint, which have to be exchanged at the travel agency into the currency of the country of destination, and not over 50 forints in small change, which does not have

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AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1R

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AEUMF (SP)

14 November 1961

(MI-3758-61)

SUBJECT: Unusual Defection from Hungary to West Germany (C)

to be exchanged.

- (2) 500 cigarettes
- (3) 1 liter of alcoholic beverage
- (4) 1 kg salami

The insert is stamped by border officials during the crossing, and retained by border officials on return trip. The price for the insert is 70 forints.

d. Preparation for Departure

After her trip to BRATISLAVA, while in BUDAPEST again, Source visited her employer at the [redacted] and asked him to call the Austrian Embassy (since she speaks only limited German herself), and to find out the phone number of the Austrian [redacted].

[redacted] since she needed a ride to COPENHAGEN, having no foreign currency herself (the promised money from the family in COPENHAGEN failed to arrive by mail); however, her employer refused to call. Source finally obtained the phone number from a relative (name [redacted]) of a co-worker; however, she had no need to use it. Source's friend, a girl named [redacted] who is employed as a clerk at the [redacted] told her of an Italian businessman named [redacted] who was to depart BUDAPEST for Italy within a few days, and who would be willing to give her a ride in his car. The departure date was set for [redacted].

CARDE

On [redacted] Source visited the [redacted] where she was employed for the last time, and states that she was amazed to hear from her employer and his secretary, details of her planned ride with the Italian businessman, such as the color of the car, make, model, route, etc., even though she did not tell them about it herself. Source suspects that the secretary works as an informant for the Hungarian Security Police, and possibly obtained the information through this source. She further states that the secretary tried to discourage her from accepting the ride.

e. Trip from BUDAPEST to AUSTRIA

At approximately 0500 hrs, [redacted] Source went to the [redacted] accompanied by her mother and god mother, where she met the Italian. They departed by car shortly after 0500 hrs. Source states

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5 USC 552a (b) (7) (D)
5 USC 552a (b) (7) (C)

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AEUMF (SF)
(MI-3758-61)

14 November 1961

SUBJECT: Unusual Defection from Hungary to West Germany (S)(U)

that while they were getting in the car, a man dressed in civilian clothes was taking pictures of them and the car with a small movie camera. She has no explanation for this.

They crossed the Hungarian-Austrian border at approximately 0800 hrs, arriving in VIENNA at approximately 1000 hrs, [redacted] The Italian drove her to the office of the [redacted] There she was told that there was no one driving in the direction of COPENHAGEN. Not knowing where to stay, Source called [redacted] aunt in VIENNA. [redacted] gave Source the phone number prior to her departure. She contacted the aunt and received permission to stay with her. The Italian businessman drove her to the aunt's residence, and before departing, gave her 100 Austrian shillings.

Source states that she also had an introductory note from the fiance of one of her girl friends in BUDAPEST, [redacted] The note was addressed to [redacted] ther, who resides in [redacted] Source was to contact the father in case she needed help while in Austria. Source contacted [redacted] father by telephone. He came to pick her up by car the following day. (She had remained overnight at [redacted] aunt). She remained at the residence of [redacted] father in [redacted] until [redacted] While there, she met an old woman (friend of [redacted] father), who gave her 300 shillings and 25 W. German DM to help her.

f. AUSTRIA to DENMARK

On [redacted] Source departed VIENNA by car (a ride arranged through the [redacted] arriving in FRANKFURT/Main on [redacted] For this ride, Source paid 250 Austrian shillings. In FRANKFURT, Source remained several hours at the Bahnhofs Mission, and finally received a ride from a Frenchman who took her to HAMBURG, where she arrived in the afternoon, [redacted] For this ride, Source paid 25 DMW.

In HAMBURG, Source contacted an aunt of a West German boy she had corresponded with for the past six years (Source states that corresponding with foreigners is popular among the Hungarian youth). The boy was not at home; however, he arrived the following day and hitchhiked with her to the Danish border. From there, they continued via boat and train to COPENHAGEN (the West German paid all expenses). In COPENHAGEN, she joined the [redacted] family and remained there until [redacted]

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ON 11 Jan 99
BY CDR USAINSCOM F01/PO
AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1R

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5 USC 552a (b) (7) (C)
5 USC 552a (b) (7) (D)

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AEUMF (SP)
(MI-3758-61)

14 November 1961

SUBJECT: Unusual Defection from Hungary to West Germany (S)(U)

Source states that while she was in COPENHAGEN, she received a phone call from the Hungarian Embassy. The Hungarian official gave her a phone number of a Hungarian, residing in COPENHAGEN, whom she was to contact, and who was to show her around the city. She did not accept the offer. The embassy also arranged for her to meet another Hungarian at a local cafe. She was given the name of this man, but does not recall it. She states that she kept this meeting, and when she arrived to the cafe, she was met by three Hungarians. They spent several hours talking mostly about Hungary (Source states that they kept telling her how much nicer things are in Hungary, etc., as to discourage her from becoming a possible defector). She states that they did not threaten her in any way, that they were not aware of her intention to remain in the West.

g. DENMARK to WEST GERMANY

On Source departed COPENHAGEN, via train, for STUTTGART (the family paid her fare). In STUTTGART, she stayed with a German family, who are friends of the family, until . While in STUTTGART, she reported to the local police and told them her desire to remain in the West. She left STUTTGART on for ZIRNDORF, where she surrendered her passport, and applied for political asylum.

4. (U) Disposition of Refugee

Upon the completion of interrogation (estimated) Refugee will return to Camp ZIRNDORF.

5. (U) Remarks

It should be noted that
 their professional opinion to the effect that source is a Soviet bloc agent, and that she has been targeted against same, unknown as yet, object.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

1 Incl
Letter from Source's Stepfather (U)
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Ely S. Matteri
ELY S. MATTERI
Major, AI(MPC)
Operations Officer

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5 USC 552a (b) (1) (C)
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TRANSLATION FROM HUNGARIAN LANGUAGE

Sender: _____

TO: _____

undated

Dearest _____

Hoping that you have already arrived so that you will receive this letter. It has been a pretty long while since we have received any news from you. We think that you have already departed Denmark, but where you are (Hamburg, Stuttgart) we have no idea. We have been waiting for you every day last week. We believed and hoped that you will pop in unexpectedly, and after your long wandering, you will return home to rest. Slowly complete your tour and return so that you can rest up from the long car rides. Imagine how good it will feel to board a streetcar or the hinged # 6.

Life goes on unchanged with us here at home. Interesting things or news do not occur very much. Some of your cavaliers are calling up and asking about you, as a matter of fact, you have most likely received letters from them since then. On Sunday, _____ departed on an 8-day mountain tour. Well, this would be about all the personal home news. The rejection notices from the University, that is from the Min. (TN: Ministry) did not arrive to this date. Allegedly, they are mailing them either today or tomorrow. The acceptance notices up to the 9th of this month have been already mailed to those individuals who have been accepted.

Coming back to the beginning of my letter - we are waiting for you to return home. You have seen a lot and you have experienced quite a bit. This you must write up because it will be forgotten in the large accumulation. While you are at home, save your energy, and next year you can again go on a tour with a pre-planned program. Now you already have experience, and what is more important, linguistic knowledge.

Every day we are awaiting for you to return home, whether you will return unexpectedly, or whether you will notify us. Of course, we would be very happy if we would receive some notification from you. We would very much like to know what is happening with you, and how you are? How is your tooth? Are you suffering very much from it? Oh, there are so many questions I could ask, but I am closing now, and am hurrying to the post office so that you will receive it as soon as possible.

In other words hurry home - we are very much awaiting you. Kissing you with much love

Father

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Incl 1 to MI-3758-61
C&D Bn, 513th IC Group

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HEADQUARTERS
66TH INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP
United States Army, Europe
APO 154 US Forces

12 DEC. 1961

FILE
AEUC-OCB(B)
HE-500484/B

SUBJECT: Operational Information, Hungary/Travel and Controls (U)

TO: See Distribution

1. (U) Reference is made to Section 10d(4) USAREUR ICD.
2. (C) A letter written by a resident of Varosloed (YN 0024), Hungary to a resident of West Germany in late November indicates that the son of the West German resident was unable to travel to West Germany. The son had travelled to Budapest en route to West Germany but was instructed to return home in that all visas had been cancelled for a period of three months. No explanation was given for the reported blanket cancellation of exit visas.
3. (U) The above information has been furnished DCSI by report #KL-481.

FOR THE COMMANDER:


James H. McComas Jr.
BEN C. McCOMAS JR
Major, AI (Inf)
Adjutant

Stgt M 8469/AHA

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HEADQUARTERS
66TH INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP
United States Army, Europe
APO 154 US Forces

My Allen

AEUC-OCB(B)
HE-500484/B

4. NOV. 1961

SUBJECT: Operational Information, Hungary (U)

TO: See Distribution

WARNING NOTICE - SENSITIVE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

1. (U) Reference is made to Section 10d, USAREUR ICD.
2. (U) Forwarded herewith is a report regarding SUBJECT obtained from a US legal traveler who was debriefed upon return from travel into Hungary. This information has been forwarded to DCSI, USAREUR as a part of Report Number KL-291, this headquarters.

FOR THE COMMANDER:


1 Incl
Para 8, IR KL-291

for *Julia R. Aut, eworua*
BEN C. McCOMAS JR
Major, AI (Inf)
Adjutant

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KL-291

Report # (12-111-6-61 (B) (U))

Source: 55555 (F)

~~WARNING NOTICE - SENSITIVE SOURCES AND METHODS IN INCLOSURES~~

8. (C) Operational Information: Hungary; Source traveled by POV in Hungary during the period . The travel was arranged through the American Express Company and IBUSZ, the Hungarian national tourist agency. On source applied for the required clearance to make the journey. Subsequent inquiry revealed that the clearance had been sent to him through channels; however, this clearance did not arrive and source was assured telephonically that such clearance was a formality and not required to be among the necessary papers for entrance into Hungary. Source had received a telegram from the Hungarian Legation in Vienna, Austria informing him that the necessary visa for entry into Hungary was in their possession, and in view of the short period of time remaining before the visa was valid, it would be retained, and source could personally obtain it on his way through Vienna. Source personally appeared at the Hungarian Legation in Vienna at 0900 hours, and was informed that the necessary visa for source and his family to enter Hungary had been sent to the IBUSZ Travel Agency, located at 26 Kaerntnerstrasse, Vienna 1, Austria, and could be picked up at 1300 hours on that date. Source obtained the visa as prescribed and received no instructions regarding his projected trip, or any restrictions applicable thereto. The visa was described as a pink folder, approximately 2 1/4 by 4 inches, folded, with a center page which could be removed. The writing on the visa was in the German and Hungarian languages and source filled out the visa with the desired information in so far as possible, with the aid of his youngest son, who has some knowledge of the German language. It is to be noted that source has no proficiency in either German or Hungarian and during the entire course of the journey relied upon the limited German language ability of his son, unless the English language was spoken. Source furnished the following:

a. Customs control and entry:

(1) Source arrived at the Hungarian border crossing point near Hegyesalom (XP6109), Hungary, at approximately 1430 hours. his POV, a 1956 Chevrolet Station Wagon, license number accompanied by his wife, and their two sons, and . There were no controls by Austrian officials, and as source approached the Austrian - Hungarian border he noted a barrier across the highway. Beyond the barrier, a customs house was located on the left side of the road. Further ahead was another barrier crossing the road. Source parked his vehicle in front of the customs house and a uniformed guard appeared from inside the building, and requested source's papers. After a cursory examination he motioned for source to enter the building. Source entered the building accompanied by his youngest son. Source's wife and other son remained in their vehicle. Source proceeded to a table located directly to his front, and occupied by two other uniformed officials. He was motioned to a seat by one of the officials behind the table. Immediately

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KL-291
Report # (18-XII-6-61 (B) (U))

Source: 55555 (P)

following source's complying with these instructions, the official from outside, who had taken his papers, entered the building and placed his papers on the table in front of the two seated officials. Source's limited observation of the official who had taken his papers precluded a description. He was wearing a brown uniform as was the officials seated behind the table. These uniforms were further described as being composed of a coat and trousers. The officials wore low quarter shoes. No weapons were observed. In distinguishing the officials seated behind the table, source noted that both officials wore shoulder boards of a dark shade of brown. The official to his left, as he faced the table, had one star on his shoulder board, and the official to the right had two stars. Source described these stars to be of a metallic silver, the approximate color of pewter. He observed no other identifying factors regarding the uniform. Located on another table to the rear of the two officials there were two caps, service type with bill, facing away from him.

(2) The official with two stars motioned source to take a seat at the table beside him and began examining source's passport, visa, and other papers presented to the guard outside. Upon completion of this cursory examination, the official removed the center portion from the visa folder, which he retained, and stamped it. The other portion of the visa was also stamped and returned to source. A cursory examination was made of source's passport and it was also stamped. The official asked source how much money he had in his possession and source counted his money without removing it from his wallet, informing the official that he had 140 US dollars and 1600 Austrian shillings. This information was recorded and source was not queried regarding the monies in the possession of the other members of his party. The official then completed another form querying source concerning radios and cameras in the source's possession. Source declared the car radio in his vehicle but overlooked the small portable transistor radio in the possession of his son. He noted the cameras also but was only required to provide the name of the manufacturer. The paper containing the accounting of the radios and cameras was stamped by the official and returned to source with instructions that the paper would be presented at the time source departed the country. The official prepared another form for which the International Motor Insurance Card (Green Card), which source had included among the visa and passports submitted, did not suffice. In completing this form, source was asked to present his vehicle registration and driver's license. These documents were returned to source after the form was completed, together with another card which source understood to be a third party insurance binder, and he was requested to pay 20 Hungarian Forints for this insurance. Upon informing the official that he did not have any Hungarian currency in his possession, source was directed to another table located nearby, where he would be able to convert

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KL-291
Report # (12-KIL-6-61 (B) (U))

Source: 55555 (F)

his currency. Source presented four twenty dollar bills in US currency to the individual at this table, whom he could describe only as being dressed in civilian clothes. The exchanger returned two of the bills indicating that this was too much money to be exchanged. Source asked if there was any restriction regarding the amount of money he could convert, and the exchanger responded by inquiring as to how many people were in source's party. Source replied that there were four persons and the exchanger took one of the bills back and converted sixty dollars into Hungarian Forints. In exchange for the sixty US dollars, source received 1,384.20 Hungarian Forints. Source returned to the official who had been processing his papers, gave him the prescribed amount, and was further informed that it was also required that he purchase a road map of Hungary and a city plan of Budapest. These items amounted to 11 Forints, which source paid, and his processed and stamped papers were returned to him. Source was instructed that upon arrival at his hotel in Budapest, he would present the passports, together with the remaining portion of the pink visa folder, to the clerk at the hotel. The official then instructed source to follow him outside, and proceeded directly to source's vehicle, the only vehicle in the vicinity.

(3) The official directed source to open the rear door of the station wagon, and upon compliance, source was instructed to open a suitcase and handbag. After merely glancing at the contents, the official indicated he was satisfied, walked around the vehicle, looking in the windows, and motioned to source that he could proceed on his journey.

(4) Source estimated the entire border processing to have consumed approximately 40 minutes. Neither he, nor any member of his family, was subjected to any physical search, and the attitude on the part of the officials was courteous and completely businesslike. Source noted that in addition to the three uniformed men mentioned, and the civilian money changer, he also observed a woman in the building who appeared to be the operator of a small refreshment counter located therein. Also, another uniformed official was observed in a corridor at the other end of the building. This portion of the building appeared to contain small offices. No other persons were observed except another traveler who appeared to be undergoing exit processing and who departed immediately following source's entering the building. Source further noted that during his processing, the customs official wearing one star, answered a telephone call. Source heard this official use the word "Amerikanischer" (American), listen for a moment, and leave the building. Immediately following this official's departure, source heard a motorcycle engine start near the building and depart into the distance. The official returned in approximately five minutes, without comment, and returned to his chair. Source had not observed a motorcycle in the vicinity of the building, nor did he hear a motorcycle return to the building.

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KL-291

Report # (18-XII-6-61 (B) (U))

Source: 55555 (P)

(5) As directed by the official, source proceeded on his journey toward Budapest, and as his vehicle approached the second barrier, it was raised. After passing the second barrier, source observed 12 uniformed soldiers, staggered along both sides of the road, at approximately 100 yard intervals. They did not appear to be engaged in any type of activity. Some were leaning against trees; and others were moving about, appearing to be sentries. They glanced casually at the vehicle as it proceeded but displayed no other interest. All were armed with sub-machine guns, and attired in olive drab colored uniforms, comprised of jacket and trousers, similar to the old blanket type OD uniforms worn by US troops during World War II. Source was unable to recall the headgear being worn, but all were wearing boots. Source described the weapon in the possession of these soldiers as being similar to the 7.62mm Shpagin Sub-machine Gun, M1941 (PPSh) but different in that the wooden stock proceeded well beyond the breach of the weapon. No cooling jacket was present, and what appeared to be wooden strips extended along each side of the barrel to the muzzle. The weapon also had a strap for carrying and no flash hider or break was observed at the muzzle. Source noted that the weapons had a drum type magazine unlike any he had ever seen. The drum was not solid, but more like a reel, with the cartridges located therein visible and exposed.

b. Customs control exit:

(1) On his return trip, source arrived at the Hegyeshalom, Hungary (XP6109), border checkpoint at approximately 1430 hours, L. Source observed the same individuals to be present as at the time of his entrance into Hungary, with the exception that the money changer and the woman who appeared to be operating the refreshment stand. Also, source noted that another individual was located outside of the customs control house, and appeared to be responsible for operating a control device, located at the corner of the customs control house, which raised, or lowered, the barriers located across the road on each side of the customs control house. This individual was attired in a similar uniform to those worn by the officials described at the time of entry; however, the quality was not as good and the individual appeared to be a soldier sentry, as opposed to the officials who processed travelers. Source was unable to offer any further description of the latter individual except that he did not appear to be armed.

(2) Source parked his vehicle in front of the customs control house, dismounted, and entered the building. He presented his passport, pink visa card, customs declaration, and allied paper to the same individual that had effected his initial processing when entering the country. The official stamped the pink visa card, which he retained, source's passport, and affixed stamps to the insurance card indicating a 30 Hungarian Forints

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KL-291

Report # (18-XXI-6-61 (B) (U))

Source: 55555 (F)

refund. The currency declaration, completed at time of entry, was initialed by the official and retained. No questions were asked in this regard. The customs declaration indicating the cameras and radio in the possession of source at the time of entry was also initialed and retained by the official. Upon completion of the processing of source's papers, source inquired as to the disposition of the Hungarian currency that he still had in his possession. The Hungarian currency, if converted to US currency, would amount to 42 dollars. The official checked the currency declaration prepared at the time of entry, and informed source that the declaration indicated source had converted 20 US dollars into Hungarian Forints at the time of his entry and therefore had obtained the additional currency elsewhere. Source attempted to explain that he had not obtained Hungarian currency at any place except the 60 dollars that was converted at the time he entered the country. This explanation was not effective due to language difficulties, and source forgot that the official had in his possession the paper indicating the currency transaction that had taken place. The official informed source that he would have to expend the Hungarian currency in his possession and referred source to a novelty and souvenir shop located in the building. Source attempted to sell the currency to travelers processing for entry into Hungary without success, and purchased several items, to include vases and liquors at the novelty and souvenir counter, expending all of the Hungarian money in his possession with the exception of 20 Hungarian Forints.

(3) During the period that source was engaged in expending the Hungarian currency in his possession, the official that had been doing his exit processing, had source's son accompany him to their vehicle parked outside. He instructed the boy to open the rear of the station wagon and casually examined the same two pieces of luggage that were checked at the time of entry. The official walked about the vehicle looking through the windows, and then opened the rear door of the vehicle on the right side, he looked under the rear seat, and instructed source's son to pull the movable back portion of the rear seat forward. Source's son did not understand, at the time, what the official meant, and the official dismissed the instructions, and indicated that the processing was complete and they were permitted to proceed to Austria. No other search was conducted and, upon source's return to the vehicle, they departed. The barrier across the road on the Austrian side was raised by the sentry observed at the corner of the customs control house. Source estimated the time consumed in his exit processing to have been approximately one and one half hours.

c. Internal controls:

(1) On [] following the completion of border processing, source proceeded to Budapest, Hungary via Hungarian route #1. At no time during the period that he was within Hungary was source, or any

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Source: 55555 (P)

member of his party, stopped, or subjected to any type of controls whatsoever. On the trip to Budapest, Source stopped along the highway several times, and on one occasion picnicked. They aroused considerable curiosity among the local inhabitants, but did not establish any contact because of the language barrier. Source stopped in Gyor, Hungary, for a short time, to view a few sights of interest, and then proceeded directly to Budapest.

(2) Upon arrival in Budapest, source proceeded directly to the Hotel Metropole, and the entire family entered the hotel with the exception of the oldest son who remained in the vehicle with the luggage. The clerk at the reception desk spoke English. Source presented his passport and stamped visas, which the clerk retained and returned the following day. Source completed and signed a registration form. The clerk explained that by retaining the passports and visas, he would be able to accomplish all of the required procedures. This would include the preparation of meal tickets, which source would be issued to exchange for his meals, either in that hotel, or those indicated on the booklet. There were no porters available, and source and his sons carried the luggage to an elevator, which took them to their accommodations on the fourth floor of the hotel. Source noted that the accommodations consisted of three adjoining rooms. The toilet was located in the hall. He further noted that during their stay at the hotel, every move was observed by the elevator operator who appeared to be on the fourth floor whenever anyone left the room to go to the toilet. All accommodations, to include subsistence had been arranged through the American Express Company and the hotel personnel were friendly, considerate and cooperative. Source inquired as to the availability of tours from the hotel but was informed that the hotel did not engage in this endeavor. At the time of check out from the hotel, the clerk appeared to stamp the visa and his passport; however, source did not examine the stamp. On the return trip to the border check point, source followed the same route used upon entering the country, and followed the same procedure of stopping and viewing interesting sights.

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United States Army, Europe
APO 154 US Forces

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10. See Dist

AEUC-OCB(B)
HE-500484/B

17 OCT. 1961

SUBJECT: Operational Information, Hungary (U)

TO: See Distribution

WARNING NOTICE - SENSITIVE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

1. (U) Reference is made to Section 10d, USAREUR ICD.
2. (U) Forwarded herewith is a report regarding SUBJECT, obtained from a US legal traveler who was debriefed upon return from travel into Hungary. This information has been forwarded to DCSI, USAREUR, as a part of Report Number MU-71, this headquarters.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

1 Incl
Para 19, IR MU-71

for Julia C. Ant, ewo doc
BEN C. McCOMAS JR
Major, AI (Inf)
Adjutant

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WARNING NOTICE - SENSITIVE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

Report Number MU-71

Source: 55555 "P"

(S) Operational Information, Hungary:

a. Source arrived at the Hungarian Border Control Station (XP 565118) at approximately 0910 hours, [L]. Source was detained about 20 minutes to clear the crossing point. Source was directed to enter a small building along the side of the road. Here he was asked for his passport and documents from the IBUSZ Travel Agency, Vienna, Austria. Source's passport was taken out of his sight for about 10 minutes. He was asked how much currency he was bringing into the country. It appeared that the guard asking the questions was not really interested. Source was asked if he was bringing a transistor radio into the country. Source replied in the affirmative; however, no notation was made of his reply. The guard typed an original and two copies of a document. He gave Source one of the carbon copies and informed him that he must keep that copy to turn in to the station on his way out of the country. The guard then accompanied Source to his vehicle and asked him if he was bringing any cigarettes into the country. Source replied in the negative. Source was required to open the trunk of his car; however, nothing was touched and only a cursory search was made. Source's camera was in plain sight in the front seat of the car; however, at no time was he asked if he had a camera. Source asked if he could deviate from Route #1 enroute to BUDAPEST. He was given an affirmative answer. At about 0930 hours, he departed from the Border Guard Station.

b. Source had a flat tire in the town of MOSONMAGYARÓVÁR (XP 6904), Hungary. An individual dressed in work clothes offered his services. He repaired the flat tire and charged Source about 35 Forints for his services. While waiting for the tire to be repaired, Source heard a radio playing in one of the houses. He noticed that the stations being played were from Vienna and Graz, Austria, or Budapest, Hungary.

c. Source arrived at the Hotel Beke in Budapest around 1730 hours, [L]. Source's passport was taken from him, and returned on the evening of [L]. Source was asked for his IBUSZ documents verifying his reservations. Source recalled that he had to pay about \$8.00 per day for his hotel room. Source asked about getting Austrian currency changed into Hungarian Forints. The bellhop of the hotel informed Source that he would take care of it for him. Source gave the bellhop about 1000 Shillings, and later the bellhop returned with Forints in exchange for his Shillings. Source does not recall the exchange rates; however, he did receive a receipt with all the details. During Source's stay at the Hotel Beke, he was not questioned in any way.

d. While walking around the city, Source purchased two packages of cigarettes from a street vendor. He paid about 40 cents for each package. He also bought a bar of soap from the same vendor, and paid about 7 cents for the soap.

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5 USC 552a (b) (7) (D)

e. While driving in the northern portion of the city of BUDAPEST, Source stopped his car to take photographs of some of the old mansions in the area. An individual approached him and suggested that Source use his balcony, from where he could take some excellent photographs of the general area. Source accepted, and later joined this individual for the evening meal.

f. On 4/1 at about 0900 hours, Source checked out of the Hotel Baka to start his trip back to Germany. No questions were asked of him at the hotel as to his destination. As Source approached the town of PILISCSABA (CT 3677), Hungary, on Route #1, he observed along the south side of Route #1 an individual with a movie camera and tripod, apparently making movies of oncoming traffic. This individual managed to finish whatever he was taking movies of and immediately put his equipment away. It appeared to Source that he was being photographed by this individual. This person had a car parked in the vicinity. The make of car was unknown to Source, except that it was of the type that is very common in Hungary. Source observed that the license number of this vehicle was either L or L.

5 USC 552a (b) (7) (C)

g. Source arrived at the Hungarian Border Crossing Station (XP 565118) at about 1345 hours. He parked his auto and went inside the Guard Station. He was required to return the carbon copy of the document he was given upon entering the country. He was asked what items he had bought while in Hungary. Source informed the official that he had bought some soap and cigarettes. An official accompanied Source to his auto, where a very fast, cursory check was made inside and in the trunk of the auto. At no time was anything touched, nor was Source required to open any of his luggage. The entire transaction took approximately 15 minutes.

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WARNING NOTICE - SENSITIVE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

Report Number: H-221

Source: 55555 (P)

5. (C) Operational Information, Hungary:

The source departed Nurnberg, GFR (PV5079), by private vehicle on [redacted] and attended a conference in Garmisch, GFR. He proceeded to Vienna, Austria (UXP0040), by private vehicle on [redacted] and departed by rail for Budapest, Hungary (CT527617) at 1615 hours [redacted]. He arrived in Budapest at 2035 hours the same day. He remained in Budapest until [redacted] and departed by rail at 0630 hours, and arrived in Vienna at 1240 hours the same day. He remained in Vienna overnight, and departed Vienna by private vehicle at 0630 hours [redacted] and arrived in Nurnberg at 1800 hours the same day.

The train arrived at the crossing control point at Hegyeshalom, Hungary (XP6109) at 1725 hours. The control point was a ten minute ride inside the Austria-Hungary border. Prior to arrival at the control point, an Austrian official checked the source's passport and queried him as to the amount of Austrian currency he was carrying. An individual in civilian clothes with a button on his coat lapel, which identified him as a Budapest police official, picked up source's passport, and stated that he would return it in ten minutes, which he did. At the control point, the passports were picked up by a person wearing a brown uniform with brown shoulder boards with 1st lieutenant insignia. The passports were taken into a long low building on the north side of the tracks. The Austrians also had customs control in this building. The train was detained 30 minutes at this point. The source did not see the person who returned the passports to the train, but his passport was returned to him shortly after the train got under way.

The same procedure was performed on the return trip, except the passports were picked up by the Hungarian official and returned by an Austrian official. The stop was of 45 minutes duration. The source noted that while the train was being serviced at the control point, the personnel who serviced the cars thoroughly checked the underside of each car. He had not observed this action on the trip into Hungary.

The source was required to declare his money on the train. The declaration form was made out in duplicate, and the source received a copy, which he returned to the authorities on the return trip. He was also required to declare his cameras and was questioned whether or not he was carrying a radio or other electrical equipment. He purchased Forints on the train at the rate of 23.07 Forints for one (1) United States dollar. The exchange of money occurred while the train was stopped at the border crossing point. The source's baggage was not inspected at any time. He could not state if other travelers' baggage was inspected as he occupied a compartment, consequently his observation of activity on the train was limited.

At the border, the source noted a wire fence, a ploughed strip approximately 25 yards wide, and then a second wire fence. He could not give an accurate description of the fences due to the limited observation and the speed of the train. He observed three watch towers situated at intervals near the fence, and one in close proximity of the tracks was manned.

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5 USC 552a (b) (7) (D)

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Report Number: H-221

Source: 55555 (F)

Upon arrival in Budapest, the source was met at the station by a female representative of IBUSZ. She engaged a taxi for the trip to the Hotel Astoria, where the source stayed. The source's hotel accommodations had been changed due to the crowded conditions resulting from the large attendance at the industrial trade fair which was in progress. The source had been issued a pink police pass along with his visa. It was taken at the hotel desk along with his passport. The police pass was stamped and returned together with his passport on the afternoon of 12. The source was required to pay 20 Forints for this service, but did not understand what the charge was for. The pass was returned to the authorities at the border control point. The source had paid IBUSZ in advance for first class hotel accommodations which he did not receive. The IBUSZ representative at the hotel could not reimburse the source, but settled the matter by issuing the source additional meal coupons which the source could use at the hotel restaurant and other eating establishments designated by IBUSZ. He recouped his money in Forints with the aid of the head waiter at the hotel. Upon departure from the hotel, the source was transported to the railroad station in a chauffeur driven sedan, again accompanied by a female representative of IBUSZ.

The source visited the industrial trade fair which was in progress. He noted approximately 20 Soviet enlisted men. The uniforms bore varied collar tabs of black, light pink, and blue. He also noted one Soviet captain and one Soviet lieutenant, both of whom wore the black collar tabs of technical troops. The balance of the troops he observed at the fair were Hungarian troops. He had casually inquired about Soviet troops stationed in Budapest and was informed that there were Soviet troops stationed in the suburbs of Budapest. He did not question further.

The source noted that construction had commenced on a new bridge on the east side of the Danube river between the Chain and Liberty bridges.

The source rode a cog train from Varosmajor, Budapest city plan, to its termination in the area of Eoloys street, where a hotel is located. While sightseeing in the area source observed a twelve story building with a large antenna mounted on the roof. The top four floors had balconies in which were mounted objects similar to radar screen. These were both round and bulldozer blade types. The source could hear an audible humming sound emitting from the building. The building was enclosed by a fence. There were no military personnel in the area. He was informed that this was a television antenna.

The source stated that all meals were of excellent quality. He ordered orange juice for breakfast the first morning and discovered that it cost him eighty cents for a small glass. Upon inquiry, he discovered there was a critical shortage of such items and also eggs and meat. He noted that the people had to stand in long lines to acquire these items.

The source could not state positively whether his baggage had been searched, but he did find his hotel room door open on several occasions, and thought at one time that his camera had been tampered with. Although the source

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Report Number: H-221

Source: 55555 (F)

had not been instructed in techniques of counter surveillance, he noted on two occasions the same individual who wore the lapel button designating him as a Budapest police official and had picked up his passport for a short time on the train. In the area of the industrial fair, the source observed this individual standing on a street corner reading a newspaper. On the evening of 1 the source and his wife visited the grill in the basement of the Hotel Astoria, and he noted the same person sitting at a table with a male companion. The source glanced up and noted that the person and his companion were looking at him. When the person became aware that the source was looking at him, he leaned back in his chair and was concealed behind a pillar. Even though the grill required a cover charge, the person and his companion departed a short time later. The source was fairly certain that the two people could not have used up their minimum charge. The source was positive that this was the same person on all three occasions.

5 USC 552a (b) (7) (D)

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HEADQUARTERS
66TH INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP
United States Army, Europe
-APO 154 US Forces

AEUC-OCB(B)
HE-500484/B

16. OCT. 1961

SUBJECT: Operational Information, Hungary (U)

TO: See Distribution

WARNING NOTICE - SENSITIVE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

1. (U) Reference is made to Section 10d, USAREUR ICD.
2. (U) Forwarded herewith is a report regarding SUBJECT, obtained from a legal traveler who was debriefed upon return from travel into Hungary. This information has been forwarded to DCSI, USAREUR, as a part of Report Number NG-41, this headquarters.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

1 Incl
Para 8, IR NG-41

for *Julia R. Aud, eworua*
BEN C. McCOMAS JR
Major, AI (Inf)
Adjutant

Stgt M 8469/AHA

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WARNING NOTICE - SENSITIVE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

Report Number: NC-41

Source: 12,413 (F)

8. (U) Operational Information, Hungary: Obtained by the Source while traveling to, and during his stay in Hungary, from _____ to _____

The Source is a stateless person married to a German citizen. He traveled under a Stateless Person's Travel Document, which was issued by the German Federal Republic, in lieu of a standard passport. The Source had no difficulty in obtaining a Hungarian visa to make the trip. He did encounter an inconvenient delay when he attempted to board the international train in Passau, GFR, to travel across Austria and into Hungary. The West German border officials informed him that he could not travel through Austria without a valid transit visa in his passport. Since it was Saturday, the Source waited until Monday when he visited the Austrian Consulate offices in Munich and obtained the necessary visa. The Austrian officials at the consulate attempted to discourage the Source from making the trip because they believed that a person traveling under the "so-called" Stateless Person's Travel Document would not be permitted to leave Hungary once he had entered.

The Source traveled by train from Munich via Vienna, Austria, into Hungary at the border crossing point at Hagyashalom. The train arrived at the border station shortly after midnight and was detained for approximately one (1) hour while the border police and customs made an inspection of the train. The passengers were not searched; however, their luggage was opened, but no attempt was made by the Hungarian officials to search the baggage. The passengers were directed to declare all types of currencies and amounts carried. Cameras and other valuables were registered with the customs officers. Exchange of foreign currencies for Hungarian Forints was accomplished at the border station at the rate of 5.76 Forints per DM 1. Persons exchanging money were informed that when departing from Hungary they would be permitted to carry out a maximum of ten (10) Hungarian Forints in coin and that in excess of ten (10) Forints must either be spent by the traveler before departing, or this money would be turned in or confiscated at the border station and they would receive nothing in return.

During Source's stay in the city of Szeged, he traveled freely about the city without incident. The only security measures or police activity noted was the twice weekly police roadblocks set up on all roads leading out of the city. These roadblocks were manned by city police every Monday and Wednesday and they stopped all bicyclists going out of the city for the purpose of checking the registration papers for the vehicle and the identity of the rider. This is supposedly part of a campaign to reduce the number of bicycle thefts on market days. Traffic entering the city was not checked on these days.

The only travel outside the city performed by the Source was to Szentes by motor bike with a relative. The trip was made without incident.

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5 USC 552a (b) (7) (D)

The Source visited several eating and drinking establishments in the city of Szeged. On one such occasion, a lone guest was pointed out to him as being a plain-clothesman of the city police force and the Source was warned not to speak too freely when such persons were present.

Upon arrival in Szeged, the Source first visited the city police administration in order to register. The buildings are located on the south-east corner of the intersection of Kossuth Lajos sugarut and Parisi Korut. The installation consists of three buildings fronting on Kossuth Lajos sugarut. The corner building, Building #1, is an old two story brown building which contains the registration offices and is open to the general public. The center building (Building #2) is also an old two story brown building, but separated from the first building by a small driveway and walkway leading from the street to the rear of the buildings. The building (Building #3) adjoining this smaller building appears to be a new structure, four (4) stories high. The windows of this building are barred and only escorted visitors are permitted to enter or depart. This third building is also known as the police headquarters building. One of Source's relatives believes that HIS has offices in this building. All three buildings have entrances on the Kossuth Lajos sugarut street. On his first visit to the police station, at 0830 hours on , for the purpose of registering, Source visited the registration offices located in Building #1. He was accompanied by a relative on this visit. After completing the formality of registering, he was interrogated for an hour and a half by a Captain who worked in the registry office. The Captain questioned the Source as to his earnings in West Germany; his opinions on the current political situation including his opinions regarding the East German peace treaty. He then proceeded to question the Source about US Army positions, the numbers of troops he observed, and where he had observed them. The Captain then returned to the first line of questioning about personal life in West Germany. A civilian sat in on the interrogation, but did not speak during the interrogation.

The Source made a second visit to the police station on after his uncle had informed him the the Chief of Police had requested the uncle to relay the message to have the Subject appear at the police headquarters for the purpose of extending his stay in Hungary. On this occasion he was directed to report to Building #2. He was directed to appear at 1400 hours on . On this visit he was interrogated for two (2) hours, and the line of questioning ran as before with the exception that he was asked to return to Hungary in with his family, for the purpose of re-establishing his residence in Hungary. He was told that he would be furnished an apartment, a job and all that he would require after making this move. At the end of the interrogation he was informed that he had permission to remain for two more weeks in Hungary.

On , the Source visited the police station for the purpose of de-registering before departing on his return trip to West Germany. He reported to the police station at 0830 hours, and his de-registration was accomplished at 0940 hours. From 1000 hours to 1230 hours on this date, the Source was interrogated in Building #3 by the police chief and an unidentified Major, for two and a half hours. He departed from the police station at 1230 hours. The line of questioning at this interrogation was similar to the two preceding interrogations.

5 USC 552a (b) (7) (D)

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Attached as Inclosure #1 is sketch of City Police Headquarters, Szeged.

Descriptions and identifications of Hungarian officials and interrogators provided by the Source are as follows:

Interrogation of: L in Building #1:

Interrogator "A":

Name: Unknown
 Apparent Age: 29 years
 Height: 5 feet 7 inches
 Weight: 150 pounds
 Hair: Dark brown to black; full head; straight hair parted on left side.
 Eyes: Unknown
 Complexion: Dark and sun-tanned
 Languages: Did not speak in the Source's presence.
 Dress: Civilian suit
 Teeth: Good
 No further information available.

Interrogator "B":

Name: Unknown
 Apparent Age: 40 years
 Height: 5 feet 9 inches
 Hair: Dark; speckled with grey on sides; full head; no part.
 Eyes: Unknown
 Complexion: Dark
 Languages: Hungarian
 Dress: Civilian
 Rank: Captain
 Position: Foreigners' Registration Office at police headquarters.

Interrogation of L and L. The second interrogation was conducted in Building #2, and the third interrogation was conducted in Building #3; the same persons conducted both these interrogations.

Interrogator "C":

Name: L, fma
 Apparent Age: 43 years
 Height: 5 feet 7 inches
 Weight: 158 pounds
 Build: Muscular
 Hair: Dark blond; full head, combed straight back.
 Eyes: Unknown
 Shape of Face: Full round
 Complexion: Dark
 Languages: Hungarian; stated that he understands German.
 Dress: Civilian suit

Report Number: NG-41

Source: 12,413 (F)

Teeth: Good
Rank: Captain
Position: Chief of Police
No further information available.

Interrogator "D": _____
Name: V 5 USC 552a (b) (7) (C)
Apparent Age: 56 years
Height: 5 feet 10 inches
Weight: 165 pounds
Hair: Grey, full head with part on right side.
Eyes: Unknown
Shape of Face: Long
Complexion: Light
Languages: Hungarian and German
Dress: Civilian suit
Teeth: Good, may be dentures
Rank: Major
Remarks: Source stated that this man is a good friend of his
uncle.

The Source could obtain no further information because he felt that he was being watched by members of his family and acquaintances; therefore, he did not have any opportunity to make more frequent use of note-taking, nor did he have the opportunity to make frequent trips by himself around the city.

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Enclosure #1

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HEADQUARTERS
66TH INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP
United States Army, Europe
APO 154 US Forces

AEUC-OCB(B)
HE-500484/B

13. OCT. 1961

SUBJECT: Operational Information, Hungary (U)

TO: See Distribution

WARNING NOTICE - SENSITIVE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

1. (U) Reference is made to Section 10d, USAREUR ICD.
2. (U) Forwarded herewith is a report regarding SUBJECT, obtained from a legal traveler who was debriefed upon return from travel into Hungary. This information has been forwarded to DCSI, USAREUR, as a part of Report Number NG-61, this headquarters.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

1 Incl
Para 3, IR NG-61


for *Julia R. Aut, avruss*
BEN C. McCOMAS JR
Major, AI (Inf)
Adjutant

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WARNING NOTICE - SENSITIVE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

Report Number: NG-61

Source: 55555 (F)

3. ⁽¹⁴⁾~~(C)~~ Operational Information, Hungary: Source, who traveled by train and bus in Hungary during the period through , furnished the following:

a. Customs controls and physical border control measures:
On prior to the departure of Source's train from VIENNA (XP 0040), Austria, all baggage of international travelers was superficially inspected by Austrian Customs officials. The Hungarian Customs inspection took place at HEGYESHALOM (XP 6109) where the train was halted for two hours while passports were inspected and stamped, and baggage was again superficially inspected. In Source's compartment, which contained six passengers, officials casually glanced through three out of twelve pieces of luggage. Source was unable to determine whether the outside of the railroad cars were subjected to inspections. At the conclusion of his travels, Source returned through the same check-point and observed the same superficial customs clearances in effect. For physical border control measures, Source observed a double row of fencing separated by a strip of ground approximately 1.5 meters in width which he believed was mined. Although Source was unable to observe conductors or insulators along the fence, conversation with other passengers led him to believe that the wire was electrically charged.

b. Miscellaneous observations, internal:

(1) Source inquired about the apparent lack of Russian military personnel in the BUDAPEST (CT 5663) area. He was told by a resident that Russian military personnel are, with rare exceptions, forbidden to depart the kasernes on leave or pass while in military attire.

(2) During the period Source observed a great amount of activity by jet fighter aircraft in the airspace over BUDAPEST. Source was unable to determine if the activity was normal or abnormal in volume.

(3) In cities, Source's contacts were mainly lower-middle class people (e.g., mechanics, artisans and office clerks). Their earnings averaged 2000 to 2600 forints monthly. Several aged pensioners with whom Source spoke were receiving fixed pensions of 200 to 250 forints per month. Inflation, which Source considered to be rampant, has raised the cost of formerly inexpensive, low-quality shoes to 240 forints per pair.

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Report Number: NG-61

Source: 55555 (F)

In rural areas, converse to the policy of the past three years, the Hungarian government is now actively engaged in a "collectivization" program. Livestock, grains and fodder must be turned over to government agents. When "sold" in this manner, the farmer receives "credits" rather than hard cash for his products. The average farmer with whom Source spoke stated that he received "credit" payments of 800 forints monthly.

(4) In consumer goods, Source stated that, with the exception of BUDAPEST, the quantity and quality of food was very poor. Fresh meat was found to be almost non-existent. The typical diet consisted mainly of fowl to include geese, poultry, ducks and pigeons. Source further stated that the quality of fabrics in Hungary was reminiscent of "ersatz" materials existent in Germany during World War II. Paper goods, particularly books and magazines, were of such poor quality that the paper would often break when folded, creased or subjected to slight strain.

(5) In talking with the populace in regards to politics and propaganda, Source observed that the majority of persons were convinced that World War III was imminent. Source heard from a news broadcast in BUDAPEST that the GFR government had ordered the mobilization of all males between 17 and 60 years of age. The announcer stated that "this is a clear example of Nazi war-mongering." Source's opinion was that the Communist Party line during the time that he was in Hungary, was to deliberately instill fear of an imminent war in the mind of the public. A number of persons told Source that, were they certain of American support, they would actively revolt "tomorrow." Several women stated that they would not hesitate to take up arms and actively fight against the present regime.

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HEADQUARTERS
66TH INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP
United States Army, Europe
APO 154 US Forces

AEUC-OCB
HE-500484/B

6. OCT. 1961

SUBJECT: Operational Information, Hungary (U)

TO: See Distribution

WARNING NOTICE - SENSITIVE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

1. (U) Reference is made to Section 10d, USAREUR ICD.
2. (U) Forwarded herewith is a report regarding SUBJECT, obtained from a US legal traveler who was debriefed upon return from a trip into Hungary. This information has been forwarded to DCSI, USAREUR as a part of Report Number MU-11, this headquarters.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

1 Incl
Para 2, IR MU-11


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Adjutant

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WARNING NOTICE - SENSITIVE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

Report Number: MU-11

Source: 55555 "F"

2. (u) Operational Information:

Source reported that all travel arrangements were made directly through IBUSZ in VIENNA, Austria, and that except for the need of sending in passports, arrangements were made by telephone. A total of approximately ten days was required to complete all travel arrangements, with passports being returned to Source within five days after being mailed to IBUSZ in VIENNA. Source was informed that had Source desired to come to VIENNA and remain there for three days, all necessary arrangements could have been made within that period of time. Source was required to pay in advance for all meals and hotel accommodations. Source inquired if it would be possible to stay with relatives and was informed that it would be allowed but that hotel accommodations and meals would have to be paid for in any event. Source was not given any specific point of entry into Hungary, and was not informed of any prohibited articles that could not be taken into Hungary. Source traveled by POV.

Source entered Hungary at the NICKELSDORF-HEGYSHALOM (XP565118) crossing point on approximately 1400 hours. Source reported that there were six persons on duty at the Hungarian control station. Three uniformed personnel (Source did not notice if these personnel were armed and could not recall any identifying markings), one customs control man, one passport control man, and one man at the currency exchange point. Source reported that passports were checked but were not taken out of Source's sight at any time and were not cross-checked against any list. Source's funds were listed on the customs declaration but Source was not questioned re radio or camera. Source took a transistor radio and a motion-picture camera into Hungary and left the radio there with relatives. The customs control man requested that Source open three suitcases for inspection purposes. Source opened two of the suitcases and explained that the third case was locked and that the key was not available. The customs man looked at the open cases, but did not search them and said nothing about the third case. Source was not required to declare any jewelry. Source was transporting a garden-type chair and lounge on the top of the vehicle and these items were not listed on the customs declaration. The items were left with Source's relatives in Hungary. Source reported that the entire crossing check, including the exchanging of funds, was completed in approximately thirty minutes. Source was not required to show a driver's license. Source reported that there were approximately four other vehicles going through the control point at the same time, including one vehicle from the Netherlands, and that all vehicles and personnel appeared to be getting the same type of superficial inspections as Source had been given. There was no search of Source's vehicle. Source was required to obtain a triptique and insurance for the vehicle at the control station.

e USC 552a (b) (7) (D)

Source arrived at the Hotel Voerces Csillag in GYOR (XE977854), Hungary, at approximately 1530 hours. Source's passport was taken up and retained for several days. Source could not state that the passport was away from the hotel for this entire period. Source was not required to register with the police at

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Report Number: MU-11

Source: 55555 "P"

any time while in Hungary. Source made several trips to BUDAPEST, once remaining overnight at the Hotel Margit Sziget. Arrangements for this overnight stay were made by the IBUSZ office at Szabadsag ter 7 in GYOER. Source reported that there was no difficulty encountered in traveling anywhere that Source desired while in Hungary. Source made one trip to ASZOD (CT8779), Hungary, and one trip to BALATONFUERED (YN1804), Hungary. Source encountered no restrictions on the purchase of POL supplies. Other than the signs reported in paragraph 1 of this report, Source encountered no restrictions on the taking of pictures. Source reported that there did not appear to be any type of surveillance made at any time that Source was in Hungary. Source encountered no road checks at any time while traveling into, out of or within Hungary. Source reported that there appeared to be no restrictions on the purchase of Hungarian goods, but that anything that was cheap enough to purchase was very poorly made and that anything that appeared to be of any value was too expensive to purchase. Source was not required to personally de-register with the police on departure from GYOER.

Source was not required to depart Hungary at any specific crossing point, and departed from the same border control station used on entry. The same customs official was on duty at the control point as had been when Source entered the country. Source was required to turn in the vehicle insurance and triptique. Source was required to open one suitcase for inspection purposes, but no search was made. There was no search made of Source's vehicle. Source was required to show the customs declaration that had been issued at the time of entry and to account for the funds, by showing exchange slips, that had been exchanged while in Hungary. Source had no Hungarian money left on arrival at the border. Source's passport was again checked and an exit stamp was placed in the passport. The passport was not removed from Source's sight nor was it checked against any list. Source cleared the control point in approximately ten minutes. Source departed Hungary at approximately 1600 hours, c

While at the border point, Source observed that there was a vehicle apparently being detained because of improper documentation. Source made this assumption on the basis that there was no search being made of the vehicle and that the occupants of the vehicle were all (?) standing around outside the control station. The vehicle being detained was departing Hungary. Source did not recall the license plate of the vehicle. Again no questions were asked regarding whether Source had a camera or radio, also no comment was made about the fact that Source did not bring the garden furniture out of Hungary. Source further reported that all mail that was received by Source from the West while in Hungary appeared to have been opened, and that a telegram that was delivered to Source was delivered without having been placed in an envelope.

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HEADQUARTERS
66TH INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP
United States Army, Europe
APO 154 US Forces

AEUC-OCB
HE-500484/B

2. OCT. 1951

SUBJECT: Operational Information, Hungary (U)

TO: See Distribution

WARNING NOTICE - SENSITIVE ~~SOURCES~~ AND METHODS INVOLVED

1. (U) Reference is made to Section 10d, ICD.
2. (U) Forwarded herewith is a report regarding SUBJECT, obtained from the debriefing of a legal traveler source. This information has been forwarded to DCSI, USAREUR as a part of Report Number H331, this headquarters.

FOR THE COMMANDER:


1 Incl
Para 18, IR H331

for *Julia R. Paul, courier*
BEN C. McCOMAS JR
Major, AI (Inf)
Adjutant

Stgt M 8469/AHA

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WARNING NOTICE - SENSITIVE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

Report Number: H-331

Source: T-13,225

18. ^(u)_(c) Operational Information, Hungary:

a. Source applied for a visa to Hungary for the purpose of visiting her relatives presently residing in Nyiregyhaza (EU5311) and Pecs (BS8606), Hungary. Application was made with the Hungarian Consulate in East Berlin on or about for a visa in and . On Source received notification from the Hungarian Consulate in East Berlin that her visa application had been processed and required the remittance of payment for the visa via telegram. Source remitted the desired amount on . It was anticipated by Source that visa would be issued within a matter of a few days. Not having received the visa by Source called the Hungarian Consulate in East Berlin. Source was informed by the Hungarian Consulate that payment for the visa had not been received. Source then called the bank to whom the money had been sent. The bank assured Source that the money had been received on and had been remitted to the Hungarian Consulate on . The bank in Berlin assured Source that the matter would be taken care of by them. Source received her visa for Hungary on .

b. Subject departed Munich, Germany, at 0900 hours, for Hungary. Source departed Vienna, Austria, for Budapest, Hungary, at 1645 hours, by rail. Shortly after having passed Bruck Neudorf (48°01'N 16°47'E), Austria, Source's passport was inspected by officials in a grey uniform, presumed to be Austrians. Prior to arrival at Hegyeshalom, Hungary, border-crossing point, Source's passport was surrendered to the Hungarian officials dressed in olive green uniforms with green collar tabs. Passports were surrendered at approximately 1800 hours, . The train remained in Hegyeshalom for approximately 30 minutes. Source had a compartment in the first coach, and the customs officials reached Source just prior to arrival in Budapest. Source's passport was returned at 2015 hours and arrival in Budapest was at 2030 hours, . Source stated that all baggage of Hungarian nationals was searched by the customs officials. The customs officials only asked Source for the type of passport she possessed and when Source answered German, Source's baggage was not inspected. During the trip from Hegyeshalom to Budapest, all foreigners were issued a white form in duplicate which required name, DPOB, address, reason for the visit in Hungary and persons names to be visited. All places visited for more than a 24-hour period had to be recorded on this form. Source exchanged DMWs into Hungarian Forints (DMW 50.00 was Forint 288.30).

c. Source arrived in Budapest and remained in the Astoria Hotel, Budapest V, Kossuth Lajos ut 19-21, for the night of . Source's passport was surrendered along with the pink forms to .

5 USC 552a (b) (7) (D)

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Report Number: H-331

(continued)

Source: T-13,225

the desk clerk at the Astoria Hotel upon registration. A charge of Forint 20 was levied on Source for the cost of police registration. Source departed Budapest at 1030 hours, L for Nyiregyhaza. Source encountered difficulty in registering with the police in Nyiregyhaza. Four attempts were made by Source on four consecutive days without success. On the first three attempts to register, no one was present at the police station who could register Source. It was then found out that registration was not accomplished at this police station but rather at another location. The fourth attempt was then made to the second building where again Source was informed that the policeman who handled these registrations was not present and it was not known when he would be expected. Source gave up the attempt of registration. Upon Source's return to her cousin's home, this situation was related to the building supervisor of cousin's home. The building supervisor informed Source that it was not necessary for her to register with the police in Nyiregyhaza since she had already registered in Budapest. Source stated that there exists doubts in the minds of the people as to the exact procedure concerning registration with the police. Source also stated that the policeman at the police station did not seem to care whether Source registered or not since this was not his function within the police department. Attached are two forms required for registration in Hungary and which are to be transmitted to the police department in duplicate. It is the general practice that the person visited accomplishes these forms and remits them to the registration office. The visitor need not accompany the forms to the registration office. Source stated that these forms are available for purchase in stationary stores in Hungary for 50 Filler. When Source arrived in Pecs, Source's relative had already accomplished these forms and remitted them to the registration office.

5 USC 552a (b) (7) (D)

d. Source departed Budapest for Austria at 1630 hours, L. At approximately 1800 hours, a customs official entered Source's compartment. Source could not describe the uniform but stated that he was not a soldier. After customs official examined Source's passport, Source was asked if she had any Hungarian money. Source replied in the negative. This question was not asked when entering Hungary. Source was then asked to open her baggage. Since Source had two large and one small suitcase, the customs official called the porter to lower her baggage. A search was made of the two large suitcases and customs official leafed through a photograph album which had been given to her in Nyiregyhaza. The baggage search was only cursory and Source was informed that her baggage could be closed and replaced on the baggage rack. Prior to arrival in Hegyeshalom, Source's passport, the pink form with two detachable parts and the white form were surrendered to a Hungarian soldier (border guard) wearing olive green uniform with green collar tabs. The train arrived in Hegyeshalom at approximately 1900 hours and remained for 30 minutes. Source's passport was returned at approximately 2000 hours in Austria. Baggage search of all personnel in Source's compartment was made which included Source, one Frenchman and four Hungarians. No other difficulties were encountered.

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HEADQUARTERS
66TH INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP
United States Army, Europe
APO 154 US Forces

2. OCT. 1961

AEUC-OCB
HE-500484/B

SUBJECT: Operational Information, Hungary (U)

TO: See Distribution

WARNING NOTICE - SENSITIVE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

1. (U) Reference is made to Section 10d, USAREUR ICD.
2. (U) Forwarded herewith is a report regarding SUBJECT, obtained from the debriefing of a legal traveler source. This information has been forwarded to DCSI, USAREUR as a part of Report Number H341, this headquarters.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

1 Incl
Para 13, IR H341

for *Julia R. Paul, ewo sea*
BEN C. McCOMAS JR
Major, AI (Inf)
Adjutant


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File 49

(A) 17184

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WARNING NOTICE - SENSITIVE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

Report Number: H-341

Source: 55555 "F"

13. (U) Operational Information, Hungary: Source crossed the Heiligenkreuz-Rabafuezes (WN971045) Border Point at aprx 1015 hours, L Source reported that there were four personnel on duty at the Hungarian border check point. Two uniformed with green shoulderboards, one armed with a M1941 PPSH and one armed with a pistol. The other two were in civilian clothing. One of the persons in civilian clothing checked Source's passport and the other filled out the customs declaration. Source's passport was taken into another room and was out of his sight for aprx seven minutes. All of Source's funds and Source's camera were listed on the customs declaration; however, the camera was not listed by serial number. Source reported that the baggage check was very lax and that no search as such was made either of his baggage or the vehicle. There were no other people crossing the border at the same time. Source cleared the border point in aprx fifteen minutes. Aprx twenty km from the border between Csakanydoroszalo (46°58'N 16°30'E) and Koermend (XN2208) Source was stopped by a two-man patrol, wearing green shoulderboards, one man armed with a M1941 PPSH, and required to show his passport. No other check was made. Source traveled to Budapest via routes 8, 701, 702 and 7, arriving in Budapest at the Hotel Astoria at aprx 1745 hours, L Source turned in his passport, and it was retained until aprx 1700 hours, L Source was subjected to no other controls during his entire stay in Hungary. Source had complete freedom of movement while in Budapest.

Source departed Budapest at aprx 0800 hours, L via Route 1. Source was not subjected to any checks or controls between Budapest and the border but did observe two patrols of the type encountered by him as he entered Hungary. One of these patrols was located just east of Masonmagyarovar (XP7003) and the other was located between Masonmagyarovar and Hegyshalom (XP6109). Source stated that it appeared that these patrols were placed to check incoming vehicles but that there was no one stopped at the time Source passed. Source arrived at the Hegyshalom-Nickelsdorf (XP565118) Border Crossing Point at aprx 1100 hours, L Source cleared the crossing point in aprx ten minutes. Source's passport was taken into a separate room for aprx five minutes. Source was required to show all Hungarian money and was informed that he could not take any Hungarian money out of the country and that no exchange of money could be made. Source turned in the customs declaration but was not questioned about or required to show the camera. A very casual check was made of Source's baggage and no search was made of the vehicle. Source reported that there were aprx six civilians on duty at the border point, but that he observed only one uniformed person, wearing green shoulderboards and armed with a pistol.

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5 USC 552a (b) (7) (D)

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~~(b)(1)~~ 5 USC 552 (b) (3) CIA

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Page(s) 50-53

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HEADQUARTERS
66TH MILITARY INTELLIGENCE GROUP
United States Army, Europe
APO 154 US Forces

15. JUN. 1961

AEUC-OCB(B)
HE-500484/B

SUBJECT: Operational Information, Hungary (U)

TO: See Distribution

WARNING NOTICE - SENSITIVE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

1. (U) Reference is made to Section 10d(4), USAREUR ICD.
2. (U) Forwarded herewith is a report regarding SUBJECT, obtained from the debriefing of a US National legal traveler source. This information has been forwarded to DCSI, USAREUR as a part of report number H191, this headquarters.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

1 Incl
as

Alfred R. Jefferson Capt mce
BEN C. MCCOMBS JR
Major, AI (Inf)
Adjutant

Stgt M 8469/AHA

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WARNING NOTICE - SENSITIVE SOURCE AND METHODS INVOLVED

Report Number: R-123-2

Source: 95555 (F)

4. (U) Operational Information, Hungary: Source, a member of a scheduled travel tour with a West German commercial travel agency and completed a travel tour by bus in Hungary during the period [redacted] to [redacted] furnished the following:

a. Customs Control Entry: The tour arrived at the Austrian-Hungarian border check point at Magyarhalm (XP6109), Hungary in the afternoon of [redacted]. Upon arrival at the check point, the bus driver, tour guide, and passengers were required to leave the bus. All passports were collected by the Hungarian border officials and retained about 30 minutes. All luggage was taken from the bus into the building where three or four customs officials completely examined all articles therein. This examination of the luggage took about 30 minutes. Cameras and movies were declared by the passengers. The entire border processing took approximately 40 to 50 minutes. The personnel inspecting the luggage wore brown uniforms, no apparent rank, and had no weapons. The Hungarian border personnel were courteous and very efficient.

b. Customs Control Exit: The tour bus arrived at the Austrian-Hungarian border check point which source believed to be near Babafurcas (HX2704) on Highway 8 at approximately 1200 hours, [redacted]. At this check point, only the passports of the members of the tour were collected by the Hungarian border personnel. The passports were returned about 30 minutes later and the tour was permitted to proceed.

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WARNING NOTICE - SENSITIVE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

Report Number: H-261

Source: 55555(F)

5. (C) At 1645 hours, SUBJECT departed Vienna (nca), Austria, by train for Budapest (nca), Hungary. At 1730 hours, the train arrived at the border crossing station in Hegyeshalom (nca), Hungary. The train remained at this station for approximately one half an hour, while the Hungarian authorities completed border crossing control procedures, which were as follows:

a. One uniformed customs official, in the company of another, examined all passports, collected them and placed them in a leather case.

b. A third uniformed customs official accomplished the customs control. Specifically, this customs official asked SUBJECT if HE was carrying any West German or Austrian currency into Hungary. SUBJECT replied in the affirmative, and the customs official noted the amounts of these currencies, possessed by SUBJECT, on a form. SUBJECT was asked if HE was bringing a weapon into Hungary and SUBJECT replied in the negative. SUBJECT was asked if HE was transporting a radio into Hungary, and HE indicated that HE was not. SUBJECT was then asked if HE was taking a camera into Hungary, and HE replied in the affirmative, and this fact was noted on the form. After asking these questions, this customs official directed SUBJECT to sign the form, of which HE received a carbon copy. SUBJECT was informed that HE must retain this carbon copy, and exhibit it to the customs officials at the time HE exits Hungary.

c. A representative of IBUSZ came through the train car, exchanging Hungarian currency for foreign currencies, upon request. During these customs and border crossing control procedures, SUBJECT'S baggage was not subjected to a search. The train departed from Hegyeshalom at 1800 hours, and proceeded to the East Railroad Station in Budapest, arriving there at 2035 hours. During the trip from Hegyeshalom to Budapest, a customs official returned SUBJECT'S passport to HIM. With this passport, SUBJECT received a police registration document with which HE was to register HIS arrival in Budapest, and de-register at the time of HIS departure from Budapest, with the police authorities in Budapest.

d. At 0936 hours, SUBJECT departed from Budapest to Vienna by train. Approximately one half hour after departing from Budapest, a Hungarian customs official came through the train car in which SUBJECT was seated, and collected all passports. When SUBJECT

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gave up HIS passport, HE furnished HIS police registration document to this customs official. At 1200 hours, the train arrived in Hegyeshalom. The train remained there until 1250 hours, at which time it proceeded to Vienna. While in Hegyeshalom, a Hungarian customs official collected the carbon copy of the form indicating that SUBJECT entered Hungary with West German and Austrian currency, as well as a camera, which was issued to SUBJECT when HE entered Hungary. At the same time, SUBJECT was required by this customs official to account for the amount of West German and Austrian currency indicated on this form by exhibiting cash or money exchange certificates, the sums of which would equal the amounts indicated on the above-mentioned form. During this customs and border control procedure, SUBJECT was asked no questions and HIS belongings were not searched. SUBJECT noted that in HIS train car the customs officials searched the belongings of the Hungarian nationals who were traveling out of Hungary, otherwise no one was searched. Between Hegyeshalom and Vienna, an Austrian customs official returned HIS passport to HIM.

e. Regarding the above-mentioned police registration document which SUBJECT received upon entering Hungary, it was not necessary for SUBJECT to either personally register or de-register with the police authorities in Budapest. Specifically, this registration and de-registration was accomplished by the hotel officials at the hotel Astoria, Kossuth Lajos Utca 19, Budapest, where SUBJECT had HIS lodgings. When HE accepted HIS reservations at this hotel HE was required to furnish HIS passport and police registration document to the hotel receptionist. These documents were returned to SUBJECT the following day. At 2230 hours, the day before HE departed Budapest to return to West Germany, SUBJECT took HIS police registration document to the hotel receptionist and indicated that HE desired to de-register with the police in Budapest. The receptionist informed HIM that the hotel could de-register HIM. The receptionist then took SUBJECT'S police registration document and stamped the back of this document with the date and the name of the hotel. This document was then returned to SUBJECT.

f. SUBJECT disclaimed having been contacted by representatives of a hostile intelligence service while he was in Hungary. Additionally, SUBJECT commented that while in Hungary, HE noted no indications that HE was being observed by interested persons or that HIS belongings in HIS hotel room were searched.

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5 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

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7	H-281	10d(3)			Jun61		24

9. SUBJECT Operational Information, Hungary10. FORWARDED BY L 11. TELEPHONE SL 846912. INCLOSURES: None~~WARNING NOTICE: THIS REPORT CONTAINS INFORMATION THAT IS UNCLASSIFIED~~

13. REPORT: (Remarks)

(W) Operational Information, Hungary: Source who traveled by train to Hungary during the period 20 May to 30 May 1961 furnished the following:

a. Customs control entry: Source arrived at Hegyeshalom (XP 6109) at approximately 1740 hours, 20 May 1961. The train remained at this station approximately forty minutes, until the Hungarian customs officials completed their border crossing control procedures, which were as follows:

(1) One uniformed customs official went through the railroad car examining and collecting all passports.

(2) A second uniformed customs official went through the train car asking everyone if they were carrying cigarettes, coffee or chocolate into Hungary. At the same time, this customs official examined all suitcases. This search was very cursory. In the case of source, this customs official asked source to open his suitcase. When source did this, the customs official merely looked under a suit, which source packed on the top of the rest of his belongings, and then indicated that source could close the suitcase. This customs official noted that source was in possession of a brief case. He asked source what he was carrying in it. Source stated that this case contained some toilet articles. The customs official was apparently satisfied with this answer and did not require source to open his brief case.

(3) A third customs official, in the company of an IBUSZ representative, went through the train car asking the passengers if they were in possession of a camera, and how much money they were entering Hungary with.

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The IBUSZ representative changed foreign currencies into Hungarian currency upon request. Source indicated that he was in possession of a camera and West German currency. The customs official indicated the amount of West German currency in source's possession and that he had a camera on a certificate of valuables, of which source received a carbon copy. Source was informed that when he exits Hungary, he would have to exhibit this certificate; otherwise he could not take his camera with him when he leaves Hungary.

b. Customs control exit: At 0050 hours, 30 May 1961, source departed Budapest on the "Orient Arlberg" express train, bound for Vienna. At approximately 0230 hours, this train arrived at the Hegyeshalom border crossing station. The train remained at this station approximately two hours. Source's passport and police registration document were collected by a Hungarian customs official. Source's belongings were not searched and he was asked no questions. The train departed from Hegyeshalom at approximately 0430 hours, and arrived in Vienna at 0710 hours. During the trip from Hegyeshalom to Vienna, an Austrian customs official returned his passport to him.

c. Internal Controls:

(1) About one half hour prior to arriving in Budapest, a customs official returned source's passport to him. Source observed that over the Hungarian visa, entered in his passport, the customs officials stamped a notice of entry, indicating the date that source arrived in Hungary. When source gave up his passport, he also gave up a police registration document, which registered source with the police in Budapest. This registration document was returned to source with the last of the three perforated sections removed. Source arrived at the East Railroad Station in Budapest at 2030 hours.

(2) After arriving in Budapest, source immediately proceeded by taxi to the Hotel Nemzeti, Budapest, VII Josef Korut. Source reported to the hotel receptionist and received his hotel reservations. He was registered in to room 74. This receptionist instructed source to leave his passport and police registration document with him. In this regard, source was informed that the hotel would take care of registering source with the police, and for this reason the hotel needed source's passport and police registration document. He was informed that these documents would be returned to him on 22 May 1961. This receptionist also gave source a coupon slip, bearing 18 detachable coupons. This coupon slip entitled source to six breakfasts, six lunches and six suppers at the Hotel Nemzeti.

(3) When source, on 22 May 1961, went to his hotel room to retire for the night, he noted indications that his belongings in the room

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may have been searched during the day. Specifically, when he left the room that morning he left the head of the key in the clothes wardroom in a diagonal position, and when he examined this key upon returning to his room that night, he noted that the head of the key was in a vertical position. Further, he noted that one of the latches on his brief case was not closed. Subject recalled that when he left his room that morning, he had closed both latches on his brief case. During his lunch meal at the hotel, on this day, the hotel receptionist returned source's passport to him.

(4) During lunch, on 28 May 1961, source went to the hotel receptionist with his police registration document. He indicated that he wanted to de-register with the Budapest police, since he was returning to West Germany the following day. Source was informed that this could be taken care of at the hotel. The receptionist then took source's police registration document from him, stamped the date and the name of the hotel on the back of the document and gave the document back to source.

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HEADQUARTERS
COLLECTION AND DISSEMINATION BATTALION
513TH MILITARY INTELLIGENCE GROUP

AEUMF (SP)
(MI-1775-61)

2 Jun 61

SUBJECT: Legal Travel Procedures Between East Germany
and Hungary (O) (U)

TO: US Army Spec Pub Det
APO 757, US Forces

1. (U) Reference

Reference is made to D-10d(4) (SA).

2. (U) Refugee

Date of Info: 1959-Dec 1960

Evaluation: F-6

born in L

on L and last resident in L

L was employed from L

L He defected after having been

L informed that he was under investigation by the MrS.

Refugee was cooperative during debriefing.

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5 USC 552a (b) (7) (D)

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EAD SCHANDAU being the entry point by train. Source was issued a ticket by air to BUDAPEST, via PRAGUE, and was issued, for the return trip, both an ticket by air and one by rail. He chose to return by rail in order to be sure of getting home in time for Christmas.

b. Description of Trip, BERLIN-BUDAPEST

Source travelled by the East German Lufthansa airline. At Flughafen Schoenefeld he was required to surrender his passport ~~xxxxxxxx~~ before he ascended the gangway to the plane and was returned it shortly after the take-off.

The plane landed in PRAGUE, where source had to surrender his passport as he descended the gangway to go the transit waiting room. He received it back from an unidentified Czech in uniform (he thinks it was that of the Border Police) as he was ascending the gangway to re-enter the plane. Because of bad weather (haze) at the airport near BUDAPEST, the plane was forced to return to

BRATISLAVA, CSR, where source and other passengers waited two hours before taking-off again for BUDAPEST in the same plane. Source was not required to surrender his passport at any time while in the airport

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2-8/141

at BRATISLAVA. He was required however to present it to a Czech dressed in an unknown uniform (source thinks it was that of the Border Police) who was standing at the bottom of the gangway leading up to the plane as source re-entered the plane. This soldier did not read the name on the passport or look at the entries in it, nor did he take it out of the source's hand.

after

Shortly ~~before~~ the plane landed in BUDAPEST source was required to surrender his passport as he descended the gangway to a man in an unidentified uniform (source thinks it was that of the Border Police). He was returned it at a booth past which he must go after leaving the Baggage Inspection point. At the latter point, two East German technicians travelling on the same plane from BERLIN and who had apparently made the trip often enough to be on good terms with the baggage inspector, asked the latter if he were not going to open their suitcases. The official replied, "Oh, I know you people from the DDR, you've got nothing to smuggle, anyhow!", and did not open their luggage. This blanket remark apparently served to include source, for the inspector did not open source's suitcase. He merely (in German) asked source/whether he was coming to Hungary on business or pleasure (geschaeftlich oder privat?). When

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source replied that his trip was on business, the official asked him what organisation in Hungary he was coming to visit. Source named the . The official did not ask source to show any proof of either statement, and did not check it in source's passport, which was waiting for source in abovementioned booth.

5 USC 552a (b) (7) (D)

c. Stay in BUDAPEST

Source stayed at the Hotel, which was located at an unremembered street address on the Duna River. He was required by hotel authorities to surrender his passport and he received it back after 24 hours.

While in BUDAPEST source was not required to visit the police to report his movements to anyone.

Source visited several times a restaurant named the "Matyaskeller", on Matyas Ul, near Rakosci Ul. Here he saw other Germans from East and West Germany.

In BUDAPEST source saw numerous automobiles with West German number plates.

d. Return Trip to BERLIN

At no point between BUDAPEST and the CSR border was source's passport or baggage checked by Hungarian officials. However, shortly before reaching

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the CCSR border, a Czech official (source believes him to have been of the Czech Border Police) took source's passport from him.

Inside Hungary, before the train reached the CSK border at STUROVO, an Hungarian official came through the train to ask how much Hungarian money was in the possession of each traveller. Only ten forints in coins were permitted to be taken out of the country. Any funds above this had to be turned in, against a receipt.

Source received his passport back before he reached PRAGUE. He did not descend from the train during the halt at PRAGUE.

DEGIN,
In ~~XXXXXX~~ unidentified Czech officials boarded the train and shortly before the train reached the border of East Germany, at SCHMELKA, they took source's passport from him. It was returned to him after the train had passed SCHMELKA by East German Border Police.

During the entire return trip source's baggage was not opened. Only in SCHMELKA did any authorities ask source if he had any goods to declare. When he replied, no, his baggage was not opened, although in his suitcase was a bottle of whiskey and

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some paprika, bought in BUDAPEST.

4.(U) Remarks

None.

FOR THE COMMANDER

Ely S. Mattari
ELY S. MATTARI
Major AI(MFO)
Operations Officer

1 Incl: Photostat of Passport UNCLASSIFIED
(To 66th MI Gr only)


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
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DEUTSCHE DEMOKRATISCHE
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
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5 USC 552a (b) (7) (D)

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


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
5 USC 552a (b) (7) (D)



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Belonging to the Red Army
Czechoslovakia, the Red Army, the Red Army
Area of activity and service
Lithuania, the Red Army, the Red Army

Georgian, the Red Army



5 USG 1322 (b) (7) (D)

72


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Dienstvisum

Aus- und Wiedereinreise-Visum


zu ein- und ausreisefähiger Ausreise aus
und Wiedereinreise nach der
Deutschen Demokratischen Republik
mit Ausreise nach Ost-Berlin
und Einreise nach Ost-Berlin
Gültig vom 1.1.1973 bis 31.12.1973




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


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Виза

Г. [redacted]

Зарегистрирован в Отделе Виз и Регистрации
УВД Мосгорсовета

для прож. [redacted] *москве*

до [redacted]

С. [redacted]

1900


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[redacted]

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fr... L

zur ein- und mehr-maligen Ausreise aus
und Wiedereinreise nach der
Deutschen Demokratischen Republik

am... L

zur Ausreise... L

und... L

Gültig von... L

bis... L

Reisepass... L

Reise... L

STADT... L

DDR... L


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74

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
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
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


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
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
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


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
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
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


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
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
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Die DDR
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Armee.



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 1. Name: Schmidt 2

1. Name	Schmidt
2. Geburtsdatum	19.11.1928
3. Geburtsort	Leipzig
4. Beruf	Techniker
5. Wohnort	Leipzig
6. Familienstand	verheiratet
7. Kinder	2
8. Sonstige Angaben	


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 1. Name: Schmidt 3

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7. Kinder	2
8. Sonstige Angaben	

SCHAFFUNGSAMT
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
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
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


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
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Baku



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
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Vice
Hansa

DDR


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
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
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THE
BUREAU



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


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
View
Front



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
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
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Via
Rail



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


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
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Vice
Barra



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
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
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


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


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
Vice
Press



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Dieser Paß wurde in
Hamburg ausgestellt
This passport was made out at
C/o passport [illegible]

am
[illegible]
an
in

ausgestellt

(1977)

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123

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(GLEN)

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Das Ministerium für Auswärtige Angelegenheiten bittet alle in- und ausländischen Verwaltungen, den Inhaber dieses Passes frei und ungehindert reisen zu lassen und ihm nötigenfalls Schutz und Beistand zu gewähren.

Министерство Иностраннх Дел просит все внутренние и иностранные власти обеспечить владельцу настоящего паспорта свободу и беспрепятственное движение в пути и оказать ему необходимую помощь и поддержку.

The Foreign Office asks all authorities both inland and abroad to let the holder of this passport travel freely and without any obstacles, and to grant him any protection and assistance that he might require.

Le Ministère des Affaires Étrangères prie les autorités du pays et étrangères de laisser le porteur de ce passeport voyager librement et sans obstacle, et de lui procurer toute la protection et l'assistance dont il pourrait avoir besoin.

DDR

Ministerium für Auswärtige Angelegenheiten
Hauptstadt Berlin
125

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HEADQUARTERS
COLLECTION AND DISSEMINATION BATTALION
513TH MILITARY INTELLIGENCE GROUP
APO 757 US FORCES

AEUF (SP)
(MI-1645-61)

31 May 61

SUBJECT: L Tourist Trip from Hungary to East Berlin (U)

TO: Liaison Officer
66th Military Intelligence Group
w/513th Military Intelligence Group
APO 757, US Forces

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ON 16 Feb 00
BY USAINSCOM FOI/PA
Auth Para 4-102 DOD 5200.1R

1. (U) Reference

Reference is made to D-10d(4)(SA).

2. (U) Source

Date of Information: Apr 61

Evaluation: F-6

CARDED

3. (U) Procedures for L rist Trip

a. Motivation for Escape

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This Document Has Been
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1- Opn PTH SA-INT THL + Con
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for 44 66 67 MT w/513 28

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AEUMF (SP)
(MI-1648-61)

SUBJECT: L Tourist Trip from Hungary to East Berlin (e) (u)

Being dissatisfied with unreasonable working conditions, the ineligibility to study, and strong influence by the Hungarian Communist Party (MSZMP), he started serious planning for his escape in L. After much thought, Source came to the conclusion that an escape over the border into Austria was too risky and seemed almost impossible. He was unable to afford a trip to East Germany where he might escape to West BERLIN as a regular tourist. The only possible way to leave Hungary was to join the L and to try to get permission for travel as a member of one of the L tourist trips to East BERLIN. In order to carry out plan, he joined the L toward the L.

b. Preparations

The L was issued and sent to all members at the end of L. Source inquired from the L about a trip to East Germany scheduled for L. He was told that the number of participants had already been filled. Source then requested application forms by phone from the L for the next trip scheduled for L. These forms, together with instructions, were forwarded to Source by a messenger and delivered to him at his place of work. A three-page personal history statement was required to be completed, and Source had to have two passport photos made. These photos had to be taken to the local police station for authentication and official seal. Source then obtained a letter of recommendation for foreign travel from the manager of the plant where he was employed. This letter had to be endorsed by the personnel chief, the party secretary, and the L secretary of the plant, and contained information about his performance at work and other observations concerning his political reliability. Finally, Source was required to obtain a permit for traveling abroad from the local draftboard since he had already passed tests and physical examination for entering the Hungarian Army; a military ID booklet had been issued to him.

Source personally presented the completed application, letter of recommendation, permit from draftboard and passport photos, together with a check for 650 Forints as down payment to the L. Here, all papers were checked, endorsed, and forwarded to the L for final approval.

c. Predeparture Briefing

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ON 16 Feb 00
BY USAINSCOM/FOLPA
Auth Para 4-102 DOD 5200.1R

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127

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ASSET (SI)
(MI-1648-61)
SUBJECT: L

31 May 61

ist Trip from Hungary to East Berlin (u) (C)

On L Source received a special delivery letter from the L. This agency handles all L tourist trips abroad. Source was instructed in this letter that his request for a trip to East BERLIN had been approved. He was instructed that he would travel with a group scheduled to leave BUDAPEST on L to report for a predeparture briefing on L the day prior to departure. At this briefing, the final installment for all expenses in the amount of 1,725 Forints was to be paid to the representative of the travel agency.

The briefing took place in a building across from the US Legation in BUDAPEST, Szabadsag Tér (Square). Source arrived at this briefing approximately 20 minutes late. The group consisted of approximately 40 youths, of these about 10 were girls. Shortly after Source arrived at the briefing, an unidentified L official lectured all present on the dangers involved during the trip. This official warned against talking to people who are well dressed and who drive large automobiles. He cautioned everyone not to become too friendly with anyone in East BERLIN. The dangers of meeting agents employed by the US Secret Service and recruiters for the French Foreign Legion were also discussed. They were told that two L officials would accompany the group for the purpose of keeping everyone in line and to report any incidents to the authorities upon their return to Hungary. Violators of any rules would be dealt with severely. All youths present at the briefing were told to watch their friends and to help keeping them out of mischief. Finally, the L official told the group that purchasing of any item made in western countries was prohibited.

Source was told by an acquaintance that the first part of the briefing was given by a representative of the travel agency and consisted of a general orientation concerning the itinerary, border crossing procedures, and general conduct during the trip. The group was then instructed to report to the main railroad station in BUDAPEST at 0700 hours on L to board the special coach attached to a scheduled train.

The L official finally reminded everyone in the group to leave all identification papers, except the regular ID booklet, at home; to turn in their military ID booklets to the local draftboards; and to leave all important papers at home. They were warned that a predeparture inspection of luggage would be made in order to find any would-be defector.

d. ID and Baggage Checks at International Borders

~~Confidential~~

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AMIA: ()
(MI-1644-61)
SUBJECT:

1 May 61

Tourist Trip from Hungary to East Berlin (u) (C)

The group departed BUDAPEST at 0830 hours. No predeparture luggage inspection was conducted at the railroad station.

(1) Hungarian-CSSR Border

Collective ID and baggage checks were conducted at this border as a matter of formality. Czech border police and customs official did not make any spot checks of luggage.

(2) Czech-East German Border

The same routine was followed upon crossing this border. However, East German customs officials conducted spot checks of luggage. Source overheard the East German border policeman stating to his colleague that it was not necessary to check Hungarian members too closely because all of them are politically reliable and they would want to see the sights in East Germany and learn about the democratic principles of the Worker's and Peasant's State. Source observed other travellers being directed to discharge from the train for close inspection of luggage on the station platform by East German border police and customs officials.

(3) East German-East Berlin Check

East German police officers boarded the train at an unknown station between the Czech-East German border and East BERLIN to conduct another ID and baggage check. This again was purely routine. The police officers left the train at a station on the outskirts of East BERLIN. The group arrived in East BERLIN at 0600 hours.

a. Miscellaneous

Two officials were assigned to accompany the group. During the trip, Source was able to overhear a conversation of the two officials. They were openly worried about any possible defectors in the group because they would be held responsible for any defection. One of the officials mentioned the fact that someone at Headquarters in BUDAPEST had told him all tourist trips would be cancelled if someone should try to escape from this group. The conversation was not heard by anyone else in the group.

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~~Confidential~~

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

AEUMF (SF)

31 May 61

(41-1643-61) (b)(7)(D)

SUBJECT: L Touris. Trip from Hungary to East Berlin (2)

4. (U) Remarks

None

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ELY S. MATTERI
Major, AI(MPC)
Operations Officer

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REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ON 5 JUN 00
BY USAINSCOM FOWPA
Auth Para 4-102 DOD 5200.1R

Encl 3

WARNING NOTICE - SENSITIVE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

Report Number: **H-291**
IR-IV-12-61

Source: 13,205 "F"

4. ~~(U)~~ Operational Information, Hungary:

a. Applying for Travel Visa: Source is an employee of a West German manufacturing firm and application for the visa was made by the firm. Source traveled in company of other workers and was scheduled to demonstrate equipment manufactured by her company at the Budapest Trade Fair. Source traveled to Hungary in a company-owned sedan and returned by rail. Entry into Hungary was accomplished at the Bruckneudorf-Hegyeshalom border crossing, and exit was made at the Heyeshalom-Nickelsdorf border point.

b. Source and companions crossed the Austrian-Hungarian border at Hegyeshalom, Hungary, on ~~1~~ ~~2~~ ~~3~~ ~~4~~ ~~5~~ ~~6~~ ~~7~~ ~~8~~ ~~9~~ ~~10~~ ~~11~~ ~~12~~ ~~13~~ ~~14~~ ~~15~~ ~~16~~ ~~17~~ ~~18~~ ~~19~~ ~~20~~ ~~21~~ ~~22~~ ~~23~~ ~~24~~ ~~25~~ ~~26~~ ~~27~~ ~~28~~ ~~29~~ ~~30~~ ~~31~~ ~~1~~ ~~2~~ ~~3~~ ~~4~~ ~~5~~ ~~6~~ ~~7~~ ~~8~~ ~~9~~ ~~10~~ ~~11~~ ~~12~~ ~~13~~ ~~14~~ ~~15~~ ~~16~~ ~~17~~ ~~18~~ ~~19~~ ~~20~~ ~~21~~ ~~22~~ ~~23~~ ~~24~~ ~~25~~ ~~26~~ ~~27~~ ~~28~~ ~~29~~ ~~30~~ ~~31~~ ~~1~~ ~~2~~ ~~3~~ ~~4~~ ~~5~~ ~~6~~ ~~7~~ ~~8~~ ~~9~~ ~~10~~ ~~11~~ ~~12~~ ~~13~~ ~~14~~ ~~15~~ ~~16~~ ~~17~~ ~~18~~ ~~19~~ ~~20~~ ~~21~~ ~~22~~ ~~23~~ ~~24~~ ~~25~~ ~~26~~ ~~27~~ ~~28~~ ~~29~~ ~~30~~ ~~31~~ ~~1~~ ~~2~~ ~~3~~ ~~4~~ ~~5~~ ~~6~~ ~~7~~ ~~8~~ ~~9~~ ~~10~~ ~~11~~ ~~12~~ ~~13~~ ~~14~~ ~~15~~ ~~16~~ ~~17~~ ~~18~~ ~~19~~ ~~20~~ ~~21~~ ~~22~~ ~~23~~ ~~24~~ ~~25~~ ~~26~~ ~~27~~ ~~28~~ ~~29~~ ~~30~~ ~~31~~ ~~1~~ ~~2~~ ~~3~~ ~~4~~ ~~5~~ ~~6~~ ~~7~~ ~~8~~ ~~9~~ ~~10~~ ~~11~~ ~~12~~ 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Report Number: **H-241**
IR-IV-12-61 (Red)

Source: 13,205 "F"

and veal is non-existent except in the very best restaurants. Geese are now being imported from Poland.

There is very little activity in the field of construction with the exception of some hotel building in Budapest. The Hotel Real is scheduled to open in Budapest. ~~_____~~

Source traveled from Budapest to Vienna by rail and stated the train does not travel at high speed and the track bed is rough and bumpy.

f. As Source traveled by train from Budapest to Vienna on ~~_____~~ he observed two guard towers on the northeast side of the railroad. Towers were located at distances of approximately 200 and 300 meters from the railroad and appeared to be approximately ten to twelve meters high, wooden construction, with a guard house on top. No guards were observed in towers. Towers were located northwest of Hegyeshalom (XP5910) (see Inclosure 4) and in close proximity to Hungarian-Austrian border crossing at Hegyeshalom-Nickelsdorf. (ad) (u)

g. As Source entered Hungary on ~~_____~~ at the Bruckneudorf (48°01'N 16°47'E)-Hegyeshalom border crossing point, she observed a barbed wire fence paralleling the northeast side of the highway for a distance of approximately 500 meters. Fence was located at a distance of approximately five meters from the left shoulder of the highway, and was from two to three meters in height. A meadow (Source's description) ten meters in width was on the far side of the fence and then another fence of similar construction ran parallel to the fence along the road. Source observed farmers working in the area between the fences.

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
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DOD DIR 5200.10

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17

Sheet 4858E
MPS Series M 773



LEGEND

- 1 = Guard Towers
- 2 = Main Rail Line - VIENNA to BUDAPEST
- 3 = Austrian - Hungarian Border

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Indicated below are one or more statements which provide a brief rationale for the deletion of this page.

- ☒ Information has been withheld in its entirety in accordance with the following exemption(s):

~~EO 552 (b) (1)~~

~~EO 552 (b) (3)~~ CIA

It is not reasonable to segregate meaningful portions of the record for release.

- ☐ Information pertains solely to another individual with no reference to you and/or the subject of your request.
- ☐ Information originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.
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FOR THIS PAGE.

Page(s) 134-135

FILE
66TH MILITARY INTELLIGENCE GROUP
United States Army, Europe
APO 154 US Forces

25 APR 1961

ARJG-OCB(B)
E-500484/C (H-14-61)

SUBJECT: Operational Information, Hungary (U)

TO: See Distribution

1. (U) Reference is made to Section 10d, WLMRBR EDO.
2. (U) Forwarded herewith for your information is result of debriefing re Subject, of legal traveler source recently returned from a thirteen day POV trip to Hungary. This information is included in Report #H-14-61, this headquarters, forwarded to ARJG-P.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

1 Incl
Opnl Info, Hung (U)

BEN C. MACCHES JR
Major, AI (Inf)
Adjutant

Sgt M 8469/AMA

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2-2-2

FILE #15-500467/3

USAREUR INTELLIGENCE REPORT

ATTN Intelligence Division BRANCH Production SECTION

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
UNIT	REPORT NUMBER	REFERENCE	PROJECT NUMBER	SOURCE NR. & EVAL	DATE OF INFO	DATE OF REPORT	COUNTRY

9. SUBJECT Operational Information, Hungary (U)10. FORWARDED BY L11. TELEPHONE 12. INCLOSURES: None

WARNING NOTICE - SENSITIVE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

13. REPORT: (Remarks)

Source furnished the following information concerning a tour to Hungary during the period L

a. General: The tour was arranged through Sheffler Travel Service, Frankfurt/Main at a cost of \$75.00 per person. No instructions regarding restrictions of any kind were given prior to departure. Source departed Frankfurt/Main at 1030 hours, L. Source's passport with stamped visa was returned to him by the Sheffler guide upon boarding the bus at Frankfurt/Main.

b. Border controls-entry: Upon departure from Vienna, Austria members of the tour were issued forms on which they were required to list all types and amounts of monies in their possession. At the border crossing point, Hegyeshalom (XP6109), Hungary, these forms were picked up. Source observed no evidence of fencing or watchtowers on the border. At the checkpoint in Hegyeshalom, Hungary, source observed six uniformed personnel. Uniforms were khaki in color of what appeared to be wool material. Two of the individuals were armed with pistols and four with sub machine guns equipped with drum-type magazines. A uniformed individual entered the bus at the checkpoint, compared the photograph of each passport with its owner, retained the passport and requested the owner to dismount. The passports were taken into a one story wooden building at the checkpoint. Source noted that some of the baggage was checked but was unable to determine the thoroughness of this check. No articles were impounded or sealed at the checkpoint, nor was there any body search of the tour members. Source was not required to complete any forms at the checkpoint. After a halt of about one-half hour at the checkpoint, the tour proceeded.

c. Internal travel and controls: The tour arrived in Budapest(CT5565)

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Auth Para 4-102 DOD 5200.1R

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(WHEN FILLED IN)

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FORM
AE 20 NOV 59 3197

AGL (1) 12-59-24M-74952

REPLACES AE FORMS 519 AND 519A, 2095, 2262, AND 2263 AND 2263-1, WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

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SUBJECT: Operational Information, Hungary (U)

at approximately 1830 hours. [redacted] Billets were provided in the Hotel Sallert for the nights of [redacted]. During the stay in Hungary source was in the company of a guide furnished by the Hungarian Travel Agency (IBUSZ) when away from lodgings except for a short walk taken on the evening of [redacted] in the immediate vicinity of the hotel. Two IBUSZ guides accompanied the tour during [redacted]. One of the guides picked up all passports on the morning of [redacted] with the explanation they were to be taken to the local police headquarters. The passports were returned approximately one-half hour later. Source was not required to register with the police while in Hungary, however source was required to complete a form on 3 April which indicated length of stay in Hungary, place of residence while in Hungary, and all relatives residing in Hungary. Source was not advised of any photographic restrictions in Budapest, nor did he note any restricted areas in Budapest. There was no animosity noted among the local populace. In the morning of [redacted] the tour departed Budapest for the Szentgotthard Hungary crossing point by way of Lake Balaton. The IBUSZ guide remained with the tour until approximately 15 kilometers from the border. At this point the guide stated she was not allowed to go closer to the border and departed the tour. During the travels within Hungary source noted no new road or bridge construction. (D7D)

d. Border controls exit: The tour arrived at the Szentgotthard (MCA) crossing point at approximately 1600 hours [redacted]. Source observed six uniformed personnel at the check point. Uniforms were khaki color and two of the individuals were armed with pistols and the remaining four with sub machine guns equipped with drum type magazines. No forms were required to be filled out at the exit point. Some of the baggage was checked but no articles were impounded. After a halt of approximately one hour at the check point, the tour proceeded without incident.

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H-14-61

Source:  (D)(7)(D)

7. (c) Operational Information, Hungary.

The source traveled with his private automobile, a Volkswagen sedan, to Sopron, Hungary. All necessary arrangements for the journey, to include visas and hotel accommodations, were made by the source through the Leo Linzer Reisedienst, Amberg/Opf, Germany. The source crossed the border into Hungary near Klingenbach, Austria. At the border check point, he was instructed to take all of his baggage into the check point building for inspection. When he had taken four (4) of his suitcases into the building, a border guard returned to his automobile with him, and examined the automobile by looking under the hood of the vehicle and into the rear of the car. Several packages were on the back seat of the car. The guard did not examine these packages but asked what they contained. When the source explained that they were only small gifts for his relatives, the guard did not examine them. The source returned to the check point building with the guard and was required to open his suitcases. After the suitcases were open, the guard did not search them, but visually examined the contents that could easily be seen. He examined the travel documents of the source and instructed him to report to the police in Sopron and register with them. He then took the Reisepass (passport) of the source to another room and, in approximately five (5) minutes, returned, and told the source he was free to proceed. The source departed from Hungary at the same crossing point. The examination of his personal effects was negligible on departure. When the source arrived in Sopron, he went directly to his hotel and registered. He mentioned that he had been told to report to the police and register, but the hotel personnel told him that this would not be necessary as they would extract the necessary information from his papers and register with the police for him.

While in Hungary for thirteen days, the source traveled approximately 600 kilometers through Western Hungary and was not checked for documentation or stopped by the police at any time. He did notice that his Volkswagen with German license plates attracted the attention of the local populace and was the object of curious stares whenever he stopped.

Food and lodging was good at the hotel where source stayed, and there were many items on the hotel menu, such as veal, pork and butter, that the source, through conversations with relatives, determined were not readily available in stores to the average person. The source also noticed people waiting in long lines in front of meat markets before they were open in order to be able to purchase meats in short supply.

From discussions with relatives and close friends, the source received the impression that the majority of the people in Hungary are definitely against the present regime. The only persons who appear to be satisfied are those individuals who have never known any other type of life and are in relative positions of authority under the present regime. Source was told by friends and relatives that people hesitate to send their children to church or go to church themselves since this is an indication to persons in authority that they are unreliable.

Shortly before leaving Hungary, a tire of the source's automobile was damaged beyond repair. The source attempted to purchase a replacement in

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Sopron but the only tires available were bicycle and motorcycle tires. Since the source's visa was due to expire, he returned to Austria without a spare tire.

The source was able to purchase gasoline for his automobile at approximately the same price as in West Germany, but was required to purchase coupons of five (5) liters each at the post office and exchange them for gasoline at the gasoline stations. The source heard rumors that this system is due to be changed shortly, and that individuals will be able to purchase and pay for gasoline at the stations. Highways were generally good throughout Western Hungary, but traffic was very light. (b)(7)(C)

The source previously traveled to Hungary in L by train. Although he stated this fact in his application for a visa for the current trip, no difficulty was encountered in obtaining the visa.

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FILE
HE-500484/B
HEADQUARTERS
66TH MILITARY INTELLIGENCE GROUP
United States Army, Europe
APO 154 US Forces

3 APR. 1961

AEUC-OCB

SUBJECT: Operational Information (U)

TO: Intelligence Division, USAREUR
APO 403, US Forces
ATTN: AEAGB-IP

1. (U) References:
 - a. D-10d(3) and (4) (SA), USAREUR ICD.
 - b. DALRIR 1-4.
2. (u) (c) Control of Information:
 - a. Report Number: R-5-61
 - b. Source Number and Evaluation: 55555 (F).
 - c. Date of Information: 4-13 March 1961.
3. (u) (c) Details:

On source, with a friend, departed the main railroad station at Munich, Germany, on the 0910 "Orient Express" train, arriving in Arad (46 11'N-21 19'E), Rumania, at approximately 0630 hours. They obtained their visa through the Miramundi-Reisen (Miramundi Travel Bureau), 2 Damenstiftstrasse, Munich. They were required to submit three bust photographs and show their personal identity card to the bureau officials and fill out a questionnaire in order to receive their visa. Approximately ten days were required to obtain the necessary visas. Source did not state his true place of employment on the application. He stated the purpose of his visit was to visit his parents, who live in Sfanta-Ina (Saint Anna) (46 20'N-21 30'E), Rumania. The cost of the trip as outlined by the Miramundi-Reisen office came to DMW 355.10. This figure includes five days pension which was not needed by the Source, because he stayed at the home of his parents. This figure also included cost of the train ticket plus other charges pertinent to the visa application.

The trip took the travelers through the Austro-Hungarian border town of Hegyeshalom (JP6109), Hungary, where a customs inspection of the passengers was conducted on the train. Source

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AEUC-OCB

SUBJECT: Operational Information (U)

and companion had two suitcases and a briefcase each, which were opened for inspection and cursorily searched by the Hungarian border officials. They were required to produce their passports, and to make a declaration of the currency, gold jewelry and cameras in their possession. Source showed the amount to the officials and listed this plus his possession of a camera, wrist watch and ring on the prescribed forms. No restrictive instructions were given them concerning the camera. No instruments were used during the entire search. Processing at this station lasted approximately 15 minutes.

The travelers then proceeded on their route through Budapest, Hungary, where the train halted for approximately one and one-half hours. They did not exit the train at this point even though nothing prevented it. Their visas, however, did not permit them to remain in Hungary. This was the only halt of any duration during the trip.

In the early morning hours of [redacted] the travelers arrived at the Rumanian-Hungarian border station of Curtice (46 21'N-21 19'E), Rumania, where a similar customs inspection and declarations were conducted by Rumanian officials. This inspection was also conducted on the train and lasted approximately 15 minutes. Shortly afterward the travelers arrived at Arad (46 11'N-21 19'E), Rumania, where they left the train at 0630 hours. [redacted] and boarded another train for the nearby town of Sfanta-Ana (Saint Anna), where they separated and went to the homes of their respective parents. Source stated that he reported his presence and length of visit to the police officials. Upon registering, Source learned that his movements would not be restricted in any way, and that he would not be required to personally notify the police of his departure. This could be done, and was done, by his parents after his departure. Source did not visit any installations in the surrounding community with the exception of a restaurant or two, because he wanted to confine his visit to the benefit of his parents, whom he had not seen for 18 years. Source was able to exchange money at the Nemzeti (National) Bank in Arad, at the rate of 3.57 Lei per 1 DM. Source stated that this rate of exchange has since changed to an unknown amount.

(copy)

After the five-day visit with their parents, the travelers joined company again and set out on their return trip to Munich on the 2153 hours train. [redacted] Source stated that he presented his camera to his parents as a gift before departing, and that he supplied this information to the border officials, which in turn was accepted without question. Source's

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SUBJECT: Operational Information (U)

companion was prepared to allow his camera and film for inspection, but he was not required to do so. Source showed his receipt for the money exchange made in Arad to the officials at the border stations. This inspection, as well as the one at the Austro-Hungarian border, followed the same procedure as was followed on the trip to Rumania. The travelers arrived in Munich at 2010 hours

4. ^(U) The above information was developed from a debriefing of Source, who was a Legal Traveler to Rumania.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Henry J. DeLoach
BEN C. MOCOMAS JR
Major, AI (Inf)
Adjutant

Stgt M 8469/AHA

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3-2-5 FILE

Report Number: H-17-61

Source: 55555"F"

8. ^(u)_(c) Operational Information, Hungary.

Source arrived at the Hungarian Border Station at the Heiligenkreuz, Austria/Rabafuezes (WN971044), Hungary, crossing point at approximately 0940, L

Passports of Source and passenger were taken and retained for the entire time that Source was at the control point. The passports were taken into a separate room. Source was unable to ascertain whether they were checked against a list.

A customs slip was filled out indicating that Source had two cameras, one transistor radio and also listing all currencies, by amount, that Source carried. No search of the vehicle or personal baggage was made. Customs personnel did check the baggage compartment of the vehicle and questioned Source as to the items therein. Source was also questioned as to whether field glasses were being carried. Source was issued triptique and insurance but, as there were no currency exchange facilities available, was not required to pay the fees. Source signed a statement that was purported to be a declaration that he had no other items or currency, except as listed on the customs declaration, with him. Source was not required to produce his drivers license at the border! The passports were returned as Source left the customs control point. Source departed the customs control point at approximately 1000 hours, L

(u)

At approximately 1020 hours, L Source was stopped by a two-man patrol on the western outskirts of KOERMEND XN207076 and a check of passports was made. The patrol was dressed in brown uniforms. Source stated that he could not recall any insignia or shoulder boards. One man on the patrol was armed with a PPSH M1941 (identification was made from L handbook), and the other was unarmed. The armed member of the patrol remained in such a position that he could cover the other member of the patrol while the passports were being checked. After the check of the passports, Source was allowed to proceed. No check of the vehicle was made.

Source arrived at the Hotel Astoria in BUDAPEST at approximately 1600 hours L Source surrendered his and his passenger's passports with the pink police registration slip to the clerk at the hotel. The passports and the police registration slip, with one section removed and the remaining section bearing a stamp, were returned to Source at approximately 2000 hours, L There were no other controls while Source was in BUDAPEST. Source was not required to fill out a hotel registration card or to sign a hotel registration book. Source was required to present the customs slip to the IBUSZ desk at the hotel when exchanging money. The amounts exchanged were

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Report Number: H-17-61

Source: 55555 "F"

entered on the back of the customs declaration and the transaction was stamped with a rubber stamp and initialed by the person making the transaction. Source was subjected to no other controls during his entire stay in BUDAPEST L except the control of persons attempting to observe the parade held on L . Source stated that there were no document checks in connection with movement control and that it appeared that this was only a control of traffic to the parade area. Source was not prevented from observing the various units that were participating in the parade but was unable to reach a vantage point to observe the parade itself. Source stated that he had attempted to ascertain whether he would be allowed to take pictures at the parade but that the people at the hotel had not been able to furnish or obtain the information. Source attempted to take a sightseeing trip but due to the holidays the only trip available was a boat trip on the Danube River. Source departed BUDAPEST on L at approximately 1100 hours. Source made a side trip to Esztergom for the purpose of visiting the St. Stephens Basilica. Source encountered no controls on Highway #13 between Highway #1 and Esztergom. (X)(D)

At approximately 1450 hours, L between MOSONMAGYARÓVAR XP6904 and HEGYESHALOM XP6109, Source was stopped by a two-man patrol consisting of one unarmed man and one man armed with a PPSH M1941. The armed member of the patrol remained in such a position that he could cover the other man while the check was being made. Source's passport was not requested nor was any other documentation. The member of the patrol making the check appeared to study the license plate of Source's vehicle, looked inside the vehicle and motioned Source to proceed. Members of this patrol were wearing brown uniforms. Source does not recall observing any distinctive insignia.

Source arrived at the HEGYESHALOM Hungarian Border Check Point XP572108 at approximately 1500 hours, L . He was required to turn in the Triptique and the customs declaration that had been issued when he entered Hungary. Source was also required to turn in the remainder of the police registration card. The passports were examined and an exit stamp entered, but they were not taken from Source's sight. Customs officials did not ask to see the cameras or the radio listed on the customs declaration. The customs examination was cursory with the customs officials asking only about what Source had purchased in Hungary and making little or no examination of baggage or the vehicle. Source reminded the customs officials that he had not as yet paid for the insurance and the Triptique. Source asked permission to photograph the customs house but was refused and informed that if he wanted a picture he could photograph the Welcome to Hungary sign that was nearby.

Source was allowed to retain the insurance card. It was noted that when the card was issued there was no expiration date entered. The space for the expiration date was left blank and was not filled in when Source departed Hungary; however, there was a date stamp used to cancel the stamps affixed to the card when the payment was made.

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FILE 1 HE-500484/C

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION (if any)

DISPOSITION FORM

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NO.	SUBJECT		
AEUMO-OPR-136-61	Operational Information (U)		
	FROM	DATE	COMMENT NO. 1
513th MIG In O w/66th MIG	Ch, Coll & CE Br	31 January 1961	
APO 154, US Forces	513th MI Group	Capt Rich/ibj/8386	TR
	APD 757, US Forces		

1. (U) Forwarded herewith as a matter of interest to the 66th MI Group is a copy of a legal traveler debriefing including photographs and sketches made by the source.
2. (U) The source of the information is a US National who travelled to Hungary in was not given any mission or requirements by this organization, and exploitation was confined to debriefing after his return. Source does not contemplate further visits to that country.
3. (U) Information contained in paras 7a, c, d, e, g, i, k, and l has been forwarded by this office to DCSI, Heidelberg, for evaluation.

2 Incls:
a/s

- 1 - Debriefing rpt
- 2 - Photographs

E. L. Maleady
E. L. MALEADY
Lt Col TC
Ch, Coll & CE Br

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Debriefing of a Legal Traveler

1. (u) (s) DOCUMENTATION: Source's documentation included a U.S. Passport, a Military I.D. Card, Leave Form, DA 31, and a Hungarian Visa, issued by Hungarian Consulate in Vienna, Austria, on [redacted] only documentation checked during the entire trip was the passport containing the visa.

2. (u) (s) METHOD OF ENTRY: Source accompanied a tour group organized by SCHEFFLER TOUR AGENCY, Main Office, GARMISCH, Germany, Branch Office, Frankfurt/Main, Fahrgasse Str. #3. All correspondence by and to Source was with the branch office in Frankfurt/M. Application for visa was also made through the agency and required from the middle of [redacted] to obtain the visa. Application in triplicate and six (6) I.D. photos were necessary.

3. (u) (s) THE TOUR: The tour was conducted by the Agency reported above consisting of 120 persons. Approx. 40 persons constituted a bus load. In the bus ridden by source, all were American except the tour director, his wife and the driver. The tour started on [redacted] in Frankfurt/M., passing through Heidelberg and Munich in Germany picking up other members of the tour group and crossing the Austrian border at Salzburg the same date. From Salzburg the tour proceeded to Vienna and then to the Austro-Hungarian border, Nickelsdorf (NCA) on the Austrian side and Hegyeshalom (NCA) on the Hungarian side. The border was reached at approx. 1800 hrs [redacted] The tour departed the border at approx. 1900 hrs passing through GYOR (NCA) reaching BUDAPEST at approx. 2030 hrs, [redacted]

(u) (s)

The return trip was made over the exact route as listed above. Although the tour intended to return by a route which would eventually cross the border at GRAZ (NCA), the Hungarian authorities would not allow the tour to return by any route other than the one used for entry. Tour left Budapest at approx. 1300 hrs, [redacted] and recrossed the border at approx. 1700 hrs same date.

4. (u) (s) CONTROLS: The controls as explained below were the same for both entry and exit, except where indicated. The tour buses, upon arrival at the pole barrier at the Hungarian border, were only allowed to proceed through the barrier one at a time. (This point applicable only upon entry.) As the necessary controls were finished on one bus it proceeded toward its destination and another was allowed through the barrier. Once inside the barrier a guard entered the bus, checked the passport picture against the person carrying the passport, collected all passports and departed the bus for the customs or guard house. While waiting for the guard to return, persons were allowed off the bus and they could go to the guard house but were not allowed to wander around the area or get nearer to the actual border than the bus location.

During this interim period the tour director passed around a group declaration sheet on which all persons had to account for all currency, radios

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and/or cameras with them. Approximately 20 minutes after the guard departed with the passports, he returned, distributed the passports and with them a slip of paper, approx. 5" x 8" to be turned in upon exiting the country. This slip requested the following info: name, occupation, destination, purpose of travel, D/POB, duration of stay and location of stay. (Note: upon exiting, the slips were taken from those who had them, but in a very lax manner and no trouble was encountered when it was determined a few had been lost.) No further controls were evidenced until the tour arrived in Budapest and at the hotel passports were again collected. They were, however, returned upon request the next morning with no new entries of any type.

5. (u) (c) CUSTOMS CONTROLS: No individual customs controls were exerted. Upon exiting, however, the driver had to empty the baggage compartment to a point where it could be determined that nothing other than baggage was being carried.

6. (u) (c) CURRENCIES: The tour group was informed by the director that any currency converted would not be reconverted. Source attempted to convert U.S. dollars and DMW but was only able to convert dollars. The exchange rate was 23.10 Forintz - 1.00 dollar. Conversion slips were requested upon exiting but no trouble was encountered when it was revealed that all persons had not retained them.

7. (u) (c) ITEMS OF INTEREST: During the actual debriefing on Source's stay in Budapest it was determined that he had very little of intelligence interest that could not be overtly obtained. The following described points are listed to help either confirm or deny known information.

✓ a. Source was able to clearly see the Austro-Hungarian border strip in the near vicinity of the legal crossing point Hegyeshalom. (For his impression - see Sketch, Annex 1 to this Incl.). Also noted at the border were four (4) guards, two (2) wearing long overcoats and two (2) wearing breeches and short jackets. All other clothing and accessories appeared the same - boots (black) and short-billed caps with a red star emblem. All uniforms were brown in color. The two (2) guards in long overcoats were the only ones armed, one (1) with a submachine gun (ui Hungarian) and the other with a pistol (ui bype).

b. The tour group was billeted at the Hotel GELLERT (on BUDA side). This hotel is considered by source as one of the finest he has stayed in in Europe. The food was apparently excellent and the prices very reasonable. (Shown as point 1 on Stadtplan - Annex 2.)

✓ c. Annex 3: Pictures of the only bridge in Budapest across Danube that has not been reconstructed. Source assumes from a large quantity of 1 meter sq. granite blocks piled near the old bridge abutment on the Buda side, that reconstruction is planned or about to start. (Shown on Stadtplan, Annex 2 as Pt. 4)

✓ d. Annex 4: Pictures of the "Liberty" Bridge, taken from both sides of the Danube. Bridge is considered by source to be in excellent condition. (Shown on Stadtplan, Annex 2 as Pt. 2)

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✓e. Annex 5: Pictures of the "Chain Bridge" also taken from both sides of the Danube. This bridge is also considered by source to be in excellent condition. (Shown on Stadtplan, Annex 2 as Pt. 3)

f. Annex 6: Pictures of the interior and classes in operation of a high school (GYMNASIUM) in Budapest. The school was known as the "Sugar Street School". While touring the school, source observed an English class in session and was requested to make a recording of one of the English lessons so that the pupils could study the correct manner of speech and accent. Source declined the invitation. During this tour several of the group (American teachers) acquired copies of some of the text books being used. The names of the group members are not known, however, some are from Heidelberg and some from Munich. Actual classroom teaching hours are from 0900 hrs to 1300 hrs Monday through Saturday. From 1300 hrs till ? is for individual study. (Not shown on Annex 2)

✓g. Annex 7: This picture created some speculation on Source's part. There is apparently no underground transportation or subway in Budapest but the black and white sign in the middle of this picture would lead one to believe that such existed. (Approx. loc shown on Stadtplan, Annex 2 as Pt. 5)

h. Annex 8: Pictures of AKADEMIA Street. While taking these pictures, Source was arrested? (detained) by a policeman and a soldier. Source was then escorted by the two to the building indicated by a red arrow on the photo. The entrance was guarded by two (2) young soldiers, believed to be Hungarian, however, source admits the situation was anxious enough so little detail was noted. A man in civilian clothes came to the front entrance and seeing that source was an American tourist, smiled and waved him away. No reason was determined for the detention. (not indicated on Annex 2 as exact street location could not be remembered.)

✓i. Annex 9: Picture, taken from a moving bus on return trip, is of what source believes to be an oil refinery. Oil refinery located on S side of GYOR-BUDAPEST. Highway approx. 1/2 hour distance E of GYOR. Bus speed estimated at 45-50 miles per hour. NFIA.

j. Annex 10: Picture, taken from a moving bus on return trip, is of a hillside in near vicinity E of BICSKE on N side of BICSKE-BUDAPEST Highway. The guide was speaking of a coal and mining region as source was taking this picture.

✓k. On the return trip from BUDAPEST, source saw approx. 800 meters N of BICSKE-BUDAPEST Highway approx. 20 minutes W of Budapest what appeared to be a Russian Kaserne. Due to distance and speed of bus (45-50 miles per hour), little detail could be seen. Source estimates Kaserne composed of approx. 100 barracks type buildings. Also one (1) other passenger commented that he saw the "Hammer & Sickle" flying in Kaserne area. NFIA.

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✓ 1. On the return trip by bus; Source saw, what he believed to be a Hungarian kaserne on S side of GYOR-BUDAPEST Highway approx 15 min E of Gyor. The entire installation appeared to be composed of one (1) quadrangle type building (weathered grey stone) surrounded by a two (2) meter high black iron picket fence. An entrance to the quadrangle faced the Gyor-Budapest Highway and a small portion of the interior court yard could be viewed. Source observed within the court interior approximately five (5), light arty pieces (field or anti-tank). The pieces were described as having long (approx. 2½ meters) thin tubes, no muzzle brakes, canvas covered shields and breech mechanisms and a single axle. No trails were noted. No recoil mechanisms or protrusions were noted over or under the tubes. Approximately three (3) persons in uniform (U/I) were seen at installation entrance. Due to speed of the bus and darkness little detail was noted. Source was not aware it was a military installation until he observed the arty pieces. NFIA. (No sketches obtained due to complete lack of detail.)

8. (u) Possible leads or persons of interest: On the night of L the main opera house in BUDAPEST, in an attempt to determine the plot of the opera being presented, source learned (by asking) that a man sitting three seats away spoke excellent English with a British accent. During the intermission the individual and source conversed freely about the opera. It was determined that the two (2) women sitting between them were of the same family, one his wife, the other his mother-in-law. After the opera source invited them to his hotel for a drink and they in turn invited him, after the drink, to their home. During the evening the following information was learned:

Name: L

Address: L

Description: Approximately 40 yrs. old, Jewish, 5'7", 150 lbs, dark wavy hair, receding hair line, no distinguishing characteristics

Languages: Hungarian, German, English

Employment: Works as a translator in a publishing house, translating western periodicals and books

Points of Interest: Was allegedly a member of the British Army during WWII, for four (4) years. Worked as a lorry driver. Showed Source pictures of himself with other English soldiers in Africa and Italy. (If this is true there should be a record)

The Wife: Name unk. Works in the same publishing house. Speaks Hungarian, Russian, French, German and a little English. She is approximately 35 years old, 5'9" tall, short dark hair, and not Jewish.

The Mother-in-law: No info available.

9. (u) COMMENTS:

a. No coordinates to any named locations are given as no maps of that area are available at this office.

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b. Source is untrained in any aspects of intelligence and was not briefed prior to this trip.

c. No photo data is given as source was unsure of the data and settings used. All photos are reproductions from color slides. Those pictures taken from a moving bus were stopped at 1/1000 of a second.

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AGENCY REPORT

(SR 390-320-10)

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

7999

H-364

2. DATE SUBMITTED

13 December 1960

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER

HR-038181

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

IR-I-197-60(Cell-Black)

SUBJECT was contacted on L concerning HER trip to Hungary. SUBJECT gave substantially the following information:

The itinerary was approximately as follows:

Departed Heidelberg(MV 7873), GFR at 2400 hours
ARRIVED Hungarian border (afi) at 1600 hours,
Departed Hungarian border at 1730 hours,
ARRIVED Budapest(CT 5561), Hungary 2030 hours.
Departed Budapest, Hungary 1500 hours,
ARRIVED Hungarian border at 1800 hours,
Departed Hungarian border at 1930 hours,
ARRIVED Vienna(KP 0040), Austria 2030 hours,
Departed Vienna, Austria 0700 hours,
ARRIVED Heidelberg, GFR 2030 hours,

SUBJECT does not know where the tour crossed the Hungarian border, however it was located approximately one hour travelling time from Vienna, Austria.

At the border the Hungarian border personnel boarded the bus and collected the passports from the passengers, they also collected a form which had been prepared under direction of the German Guide on the trip between Vienna and the border. This form declared the amount of WDM and US dollars each passenger was taking into Hungary. SUBJECT was also told by the German guide to declare, on this form, a 35mm AGFA camera SHE had with HER. This form contained SUBJECT'S name in addition to the amounts of money and the information concerning the camera.

SUBJECT'S bus was searched, but only in the passenger and luggage compartments. SUBJECT did not observe the luggage being searched, and did not observe instruments being used.

A woman guide was introduced to the passengers of SUBJECT'S bus by the German guide. SUBJECT is unable to recall her name. This woman acted as the Hungarian guide for the remainder of the tour in Hungary.

The processing at the border took approximately 30 minutes. The tour departed for Budapest, Hungary, where they arrived in about 3 hours. No stops were made until the tour reached Budapest.

In Budapest SUBJECT stayed at the Gellert Hotel. SUBJECT exchanged US dollars for Hungarian forints at this hotel at the exchange rate

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66TH MI GROUP

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT

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AGENT REPORT

(SR 300-520-10)

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

7999

2. DATE SUBMITTED

13 December 1960

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER

HE-088181

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

IR-I-197-60 (Coll-Black)
of 23 forints per 1 US dollar. SHE was given a receipt which SHE turned in at the Hungarian border on the return trip. SUBJECT does not remember the personal information contained on this receipt. It was not necessary to produce documents in order to make this exchange. SUBJECT did not register at the Gellert, however, all passengers were required to turn in their passports at the hotel desk. The passports were not returned until 1500 hours, as the tour was departing.

(S)(D)
(M)
On L SUBJECT was approached by a man and woman in the lobby of the Gellert Hotel who spoke to HER in English. This man introduced himself and his lady companion as (phonetic) L. L told SUBJECT that he was a motion picture producer for the Walt Disney Studios in California, and that he was born in Hungary, but had gone to the United States many years before. L also told SUBJECT that HE was back in Hungary to produce a motion picture. HE was interested in SUBJECT'S reactions to Budapest. HE stated that he was very depressed by the atmosphere of present day Hungary. This conversation lasted about 30 minutes. His only interest was in SUBJECT'S opinion of Budapest. This is the only contact SUBJECT had with anyone except clerks and members of HER tour group.

SUBJECT was never given a document check except at the border crossings.

SUBJECT did hear talk, but only in a joking way, and among the tour group; concerning microphones in rooms, but did not find evidence to substantiate the talk.

SUBJECT saw no evidence that would indicate that HER luggage was searched in HER absence from the hotel.

SUBJECT was not subjected to a body search.

No one offered to develop the film exposed by SUBJECT on the trip.

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(S)(D)
(M)
5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT

66TH MI GROUP

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT

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AGENT REPORT

(SR 380-320-10)

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

7999

H-363

2. DATE SUBMITTED

13 December 1960

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

IR-I-196-60(Coll-Black)

SUBJECT was contacted on [redacted] concerning HIS trip to Hungary. HE gave substantially the following information:

The itinerary was approximately as follows:

Departed Heidelberg(MV 7873), GFR at 2400 hours, [redacted]

ARRIVED Hungarian border (nfi) at 1600 hours, [redacted]

Departed Hungarian border at 1730 hours, [redacted]

ARRIVED Budapest(CT 5561), Hungary at 2030 hours, [redacted]

Departed Budapest, Hungary at 1500 hours, [redacted]

ARRIVED Hungarian border at 1800 hours, [redacted]

Departed Hungarian border at 1930 hours, [redacted]

ARRIVED Vienna(XP 0040), Austria 2030 hours, [redacted]

Departed Vienna, Austria 0700 hours, [redacted]

ARRIVED Heidelberg, GFR at 2030 hours, [redacted]

SUBJECT does not know where the tour crossed the Hungarian-Austrian border, however, it was approximately one hours travelling time from Vienna, Austria.

The Hungarian border crossing point was located in an isolated area. Both crossings were made at the same point, but upon each occasion it was dark and SUBJECT was unable to observe the area beyond the border station.

SUBJECT travelled in a group consisting of approximately 120 people in three tour busses. In addition to one English speaking guide on each bus, there was a tour director named [redacted] (nfi). [redacted] accompanied the tour in an automobile.

In Vienna, Austria, [redacted] collected the passports from the tourists and proceeded to the border approximately one hour before the tour busses. This was in order to expedite the border crossing procedures. The passports were returned at the Austrian border check point by the Austrian border guard.

Upon arriving at the Hungarian check point the busses halted and the Hungarian border guards boarded SUBJECTS bus and collected the passports. Each passenger also had a declaration form which contained the amount of WDM and US dollars in his possession. This information was compiled by the German guide on the trip from Vienna, Austria.

Money was not exchanged at the border crossing point, however, there was a small coffee bar where coffee could be purchased by the tourists.

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6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT

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AGENT REPORT

(SR 380-320-10)

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

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2. DATE SUBMITTED

13 December 1960

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

IR-I-196-60(Coll-Black)
The tourists paid for the purchases made here with WDM or US currency. Their change was returned in Hungarian forints. SUBJECT does not know the rate of exchange at this coffee shop.

SUBJECT was informed by the Hungarian official at the border crossing point that money could be exchanged at the hotel in Budapest, Hungary and that forints could not be re-exchanged. He was also told that forints must be surrendered on the return trip.

A woman appearing to be 35 to 40 years of age joined the tour at this point. She acted in the capacity of guide for the remainder of the trip in Hungary.

The border guards looked in the luggage compartment and the passenger compartment of the bus. One suitcase was removed from the luggage compartment and searched in the presence of its owner. SUBJECT did not observe instruments being used in these searches.

The processing at the Hungarian border lasted approximately 90 minutes. The passports were returned prior to departure.

The tour proceeded to Budapest. SUBJECT does not recall the names of cities enroute to Budapest. No stops were made from the border to Budapest.

In Budapest SUBJECT stayed at the Hotel Cellert. He was required to turn in HIS passport to the hotel clerk. He was also required to fill out a form in one copy listing HIS name, occupation and place of employment. SUBJECT exchanged US dollars in the Hotel Cellert. The rate of exchange was 23 forints for 1 US dollar. (b)(7)(D)

The rest of the stay consisted of guided tours to various parks, monuments and places of general tourist interest in the city of Budapest.

On [redacted] the group was taken on a tour of a Hungarian School. At the school the group visited a class of high school age students studying English. The group also attended a lecture in English given by a [redacted] (phonetic). [redacted] lectures concerned a comparison of Luther Burbank and Muenisch (phonetic) the Russian Botanist. SUBJECT recalls such phrases as "the glorious peoples republic" and "the Soviet friendship" for the Hungarian people. (b)(7)(D)

SUBJECT heard no rumors concerning "bugged" hotel rooms and two-way mirrors.

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT

L [redacted] 66TH MI GROUP

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT

L [redacted]

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AGENT REPORT

(SR 380-320-10)

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

7999

2. DATE SUBMITTED

13 December 1960

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

IR-I-196-60(Coll-Black)
There was no evidence that SUBJECTS belongings were searched in HIS absence from the hotel.

There were no restrictions on photography or travel, however, the German Guide remarked that it was unwise to take pictures in the vicinity of the border.

SUBJECT was never searched, and was never stopped for a documents check.

SUBJECT had a camera in HIS possession on the trip. No offer was made to develop the film HE exposed. HE was not required to declare HIS camera.

SUBJECT saw very few automobiles on the streets and roads of Hungary. Most vehicles observed were trucks.

To the best of SUBJECTS knowledge the tour returned to Vienna, Austria by the same route as the trip from Vienna to Budapest. The return border crossing was made at the same point as the trip into Hungary. The processing consisted of a cursory search of the busses. No luggage was searched. The passengers turned in their money declaration slips, but no questions were asked concerning the surrendering of unspent forints. The total processing time was approximately 90 minutes.

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6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY DETACHMENT
APO 757 US ARMY

MC 2208 7

28 July 1960

SUBJECT: Information on Hungarian Travel Controls

TO : Commanding Officer
Headquarters, 66th CIC Group
APO 154, United States Army
ATTN : OPO (Mr. Hartman) **OCC**
REF : Group Letter dated 18 April 1960 - Subject: Legal Travelers to Hungary

1. Forwarded are comments requested by 66th MI Group on the report in reference. The comments in sub-paragraph a, are those of the Hungarian Section of DAD Frankfurt, while those in sub-paragraph b are those of SPD.

a. Regarding the former AVH, the name of this organization has been changed, and we have received several versions of the latest designation. The most commonly accepted seems to be "Belugyminiszterium Allamvedelmi Csoport" (BACS; Interior Ministry State Security Group). Organizations such as "Munkasörseg" (Workers' Guard) merely supplement the work of the former AVH, and report to them. Apparently HOMORODI's questioners at the police station were officers of the successor organization of the AVH, or members of the uniformed police auxiliary of the AVH's successor organization. (These comments are not to be taken as completely authoritative, as DAD Headquarters may wish to make some additional comments).

b. Substantively, the data HOMORODI related on document procedure as a traveler to Hungary is correct. The 12-week waiting period for a visa from the Hungarian Embassy in Vienna, Austria, is somewhat out of the ordinary as far as our current information attests.

2. Also forwarded by SPD is a five-page SPD document entitled Travel and Documentation Controls on Western Travelers Visiting Hungary.

Attachment a/s

Stgt 8467

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TRAVEL AND DOCUMENTATION CONTROLS ON WESTERN TRAVELERS
VISITING HUNGARY

I. Required Travel Documents and How They Are Obtained

Travelers from Western countries must have a valid passport (or document in lieu thereof) from their own country, valid for travel to Hungary. They must then apply to the Hungarian consular office for a visa and an entry-exit or transit border control document (BE - ES - KIUTAZOLAP or ATUTAZASILAP). The applicant must complete and sign a visa application in duplicate and submit one copy with a passport photograph not older than 6 months to the consular office. The other copy with an identical photograph attached must be sent simultaneously by air mail to the Head-Office of IBUSZ, Budapest, V, Felszabadulas ter 5 by the agent. Travelers receive their visas from the same Hungarian consular office to which the application forms were submitted. If delivery of the visa is desired at some other Hungarian consular office, such a request must be attached to the copy of the application forms sent to IBUSZ. The 1-page visa application form calls for answers to the following 18 questions: name; position and occupation; nationality, date and place of birth; mother's name; full address; address of destination in Hungary; object of journey; name, address and occupation of acquaintances, and of relatives in Hungary; passport issuing authority; passport number; names and ages of members of family included in the passport; entry and exit route and entry and exit points; exact date of departure (presumably from point of origin); means of transportation - inward and outward; motor vehicle number; previous stays in Hungary with time and reason; in case of transit through Hungary, country of destination. (According to an unconfirmed report of March 1959, new application forms now ask almost twice as many questions and consist of a perforated longer and shorter part. This same report indicates that travelers to Hungary must now pay in advance the sum of 160 forint for every day they intend to stay in that country, irrespective of whether or not they stay with relatives or friends. Only persons visiting their children or parents are exempted from these charges.)

Entry-exit visas for groups are normally granted in two weeks and for individual tourists within three weeks plus the necessary time for mail distribution. All applications for members of a group must be forwarded at the same time, accompanied by a list in triplicate giving: full name of passengers; date and place of birth; nationality, profession; number of participants; date of departure; date of arrival and departure to and from Hungary; and entry and exit point in Hungary.

Issuance of transit visas normally requires one to two weeks, and they may be valid for as much as 60 days to allow for possible alterations in the traveler's plans. If the bearer fails to use the visa during the validity period, he must repeat the initial application procedure to obtain a renewal. The bearer is allowed 48 hours to transit Hungary, which permits a minimum of 24-28 hours in Budapest, or more with air travel.

Both the entry-exit and transit border control documents (BE-ES-KIUTAZOLAP and ATUTAZASILAP) consist of single sheets with two perforations (making them 3 section documents), the former being pinkish in color and the

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The latter a light orange or yellow. Both documents have space for the traveler's photograph and call for the following information: surname; Christian name; date and place of birth; nationality and citizenship; profession; type, number, and date of issue of passport; border entry point; and date to which document is valid. The transit border control document also calls for country of destination. The entry-exit document also has space for residence registration and de-registration and instructions for reporting to the local police in the place of residence outside of Budapest or at the KEOKH office in Budapest. By being stamped during de-registration this same border control document is transformed into an exit visa 24 hours before departure from the country.

For travel by car one should have an international driver's license and a triptyque (customs pass for temporary import of vehicle to specified country) or carnet de passage. Coupons for gasoline are issued at the border.

II. Document Controls at the Hungarian Border

Passport control at the Hungarian border is conducted by border guard officers in green uniforms. Travelers must enter Hungary only at points designated on their visa. Passports and entry-exit or transit border control documents of persons traveling by train are collected by controlling officials, who board the train from both ends, and are taken to an office in the station. The documents are returned in 60-90 minutes both containing a rectangular entry cachet showing place and date of entry, and with a section of the entry-exit transit border and control card, containing the photograph of the traveler, detached. Those in possession of entry visas are asked if they have made accommodations at their destination, and if not, the officials recommend hotels which cater to foreigners. Both the passport and border control document must be turned over to the controlling official at the same time.

Those traveling by car must present their international driver's license and car license, triptyque, or carnet de passage in addition to their passports and border control documents. Documents are taken away for 15-30 minutes for control, out of the presence of the car traveler. An April 1958 report stated that border guards waved through cars at a newly opened crossing point from Austria, near Sopron, and that there were no controls within the city of Sopron. However 2 miles from Sopron in the direction of Győr, two guards stopped traffic from both directions and forced each driver to produce identification papers. Another two-man patrol did the same thing 22 miles from Sopron. In both cases, while one guard asked for the identification papers the other kept the car covered with a light machine gun.

Air passengers for Hungary land at the Ferihegy airfield in Budapest and are met at the bottom of the ramp by two uniformed border guards who take all documents and escort the passenger to a quarantine room. Documents are returned intact after 40-45 minutes, as the border guards call the names of the passengers from the plane manifest. The Budapest entry cachet is entered on both the passport and entry exit or transit border control document.

At the same time as documents are returned to travelers, they are given a statistical sheet (STATISZTIKAI LAP) which they are asked to complete and return when and as they leave the country. The indicated purpose of the sheet is to provide data for statistics on foreign travelers. The information

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called for is: surname and Christian name; nationality; transiting Hungary, or place of residence in Hungary; purpose of the trip: if official - cultural, commercial or other, - private- visit, vacation, or sport; mode of transport employed in crossing border - air, railroad, private car, bus, ship, or other; date of arrival (to be filled in by control officials with entry cachet); date of departure (to be filled in by control official with exit cachet). All places of residence where individual spends more than 48 hours must be indicated. If more than one person is traveling on one passport, a separate statistical sheet is needed for each.

It is not certain whether the passports are checked against any list other than the passenger manifest.

Document controls on exiting from Hungary are the same as upon entry. Travelers must leave Hungary at one of the exit points listed on their visas. In leaving by train from Budapest, control officials board the train and take up the passports enroute to the border. If a person is leaving by car he must inform the police of his route and the hour of his departure. When leaving by air documents are picked up from passengers while they are in the quarantine room. The exit part of the border control document and the statistical sheet are retained at the border crossing or control point and only the passport is returned after stamping it with the exit cachet.

III. Fiscal and Customs Controls

Fiscal control or currency inspection involves questioning on possession of Hungarian or other foreign currency and filling out a declaration which is signed by the controlling border official and stamped with the name of the border station. Before entry, travelers may buy up to 50 forints to defray cost of food, etc. enroute. The declaration is returned to the traveler, who is informed that he may not leave Hungary without surrendering this form at his point of exit. According to one report the amount of foreign currency in one's possession when leaving the country is checked against the receipts of official foreign exchange agencies in the countries visited. Information varies as to whether Hungarian money may not be taken out of the country. According to some reports, travelers may take up to 200 forints in 10 and 20 forint banknotes out of the country, while others indicate that Hungarian currency must be exchanged at the border. There is no report of body search of travelers, as a check on the currency declaration.

Customs inspection although generally superficial during entry into Hungary and equally or more perfunctory during exit, may at times be very stringent. Cameras may be taken into the country but must be registered. In some cases baggage is not even opened for inspection while in one reported case luggage was checked thoroughly with particular attention to newspapers, books, periodicals, and personal notations which were not, however, confiscated. When the customs official happened upon exposed films in a piece of luggage, he notified a border guard officer who then wanted to check the film. Only after he was told that it is impossible to view exposed, undeveloped film was he satisfied. In one reported case of travelers flying into Budapest in mid-1958 there was a wait of about 45 minutes before the luggage was brought in. A customs official called out the passengers by name from the manifest and they were asked to point out their luggage. The largest

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largest piece of luggage was selected to be opened for inspection. The contents were examined by lifting the clothing in the bag and reaching down in all four corners. No scrutiny for possible concealment was made and the lining was not examined. While one official was looking through the bags another asked if they had anything to declare. Coffee, alcoholic beverage, cigarettes, and razor blades were specifically mentioned. They were permitted to take in one bottle of brandy duty free. When leaving the country they were asked if they were taking any salami, coffee, wine, alcoholic beverages, or cigarettes. Salami and coffee were not permitted but they could take 15 packs of cigarettes and one bottle each of spirits and wine. They were asked to open the smallest of their bags and the customs official made the same kind of check into the corners and lifting the clothes.

In one instance as part of the customs check for one leaving Hungary by private motor vehicle, bags had to be unloaded, and were carelessly searched; front and rear hoods had to be opened and the engine number was compared with the entry on the carnet de passage. This same traveler had a much more thorough search when entering the country. A light was flashed into the gas tank, roof and hub-cap were pounded, engine and luggage space were thoroughly scrutinized, and blankets, upholstery and foot mats had to be removed.

IV. Internal Document Controls for Foreigners

All foreigners are required to register with the Ministry of Interior Alien Registration Office (KEVEK-KULFOLDIEKET ELLENORZO ORSZAGOS MUZPONTI HIVATAL), Budapest VI, Verosmarty utca 25, or outside of Budapest at a detachment of this office at the local police station, within 24 hours after entering the country and must deregister at least 24 hours before leaving the country. Exempt from this requirement are: (1) persons who have a valid 48 hour transit visa, (2) those staying in the country as tourists participating in a group trip, and (3) those who are considered extraterritorial and have personal immunity (primarily the Ambassadors and official family). Registration forms may be purchased at tobaccos stands or at post offices. The information called for by these 3-part forms include: address in Hungary; capacity in which premises are occupied, whether as proprietor, tenant, roomer, family member, guest, employee, or hotel guest; name, in full; document pertaining to aliens - Passport number and validity period, visa number and date, residence or temporary residence permit number (LAKHATASI or TARTOZKODASI ENGEDELY); (According to a 1954 order of the Council of Ministers, these permits are required for all aliens who remain in Hungary for more than 2 weeks, but their use in actual practice has not been confirmed by available source reports.) place and date of birth; father's name and place of birth; mother's maiden name; citizenship; position; employer's name and address; schooling completed; trade or skill; marital status; wife's maiden name or husband's full name; last address abroad; previous address in Hungary; and border station and date where and when registrant entered Hungary. All three sections of the registration form must be signed by the registrant by the person providing the living quarters, and by the house warden. The latter places his rectangular cachet next to his signature in each case.

The house warden is also responsible for recording particulars, including the fact of registration or deregistration, about aliens who

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remain in premises under their control. They must notify the nearest police organ if they have knowledge of any alien who is staying at the premises without having registered or has moved out without deregistration.

In hotels and tourist houses the forms are filled out and signed by the manager or his representative. Hotels must render daily reports to the local KEOKH organ on forms provided for that purpose and they are prohibited from registering or lodging aliens in those residence or temporary residence permits, if required, the recordings are incomplete or have been corrected. During the registration procedures at hotels, the desk clerk takes the passport and the entry-exit border control document sheet and returns it the following day after it has been taken to the local police office. When returned, the entry-exit border control document has a registration entry and the stamp of the hotel. In practice it is reported that in smaller hotels and pensions no documents are called for and there is no registration beyond the normal registering at a hotel.

Travelers may travel and visit anywhere in Hungary except in border zones and military installations. Aliens must apply to local KEOKH offices for permission to travel in border zones. They may carry cameras and take pictures of any objects except military installations. There are no restrictions on the purchase of domestic travel tickets. Travelers are rarely asked to show their entry-exit border control document or other documents during internal travel except as indicated above, unless the travel is in the restricted border areas.

Deregistration is accomplished by using forms and formalities similar to those required for registration.

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HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY
SPECIAL PUBLICATIONS DETACHMENT
APO 757 US FORCES

GT 15445

10 June 1960

Subject: Comments on Hungarian Identity Document
Information Provided by Source 13066

Reference: TWX UUFWZ 28Q, dated 1 June 1960

TO: Commanding Officer
Headquarters
66th Military Intelligence Group
APO 154, US Forces

1. The information provided by Source 13066 with regard to the issue of new basic identity documents (SZEMELVI IGAZOLVANY) to all Hungarians under the age of 40 does not conform to information available to this unit and is considered basically incorrect.

2. The existence and use of a new format Hungarian basic identity document has long been known to this unit. This change was anticipated as early as 1957 when the new so-called "Kadar" emblem was adopted by the post-revolutionary government. According to one source debriefed by SPD, the new documents were available as early as October 1957 but in some areas the issue of old format documents was continued until their supply was exhausted. Another source debriefed reported that a new format document had been issued to her husband in the Spring of 1958 as a replacement for a soiled document. There is reason to believe that the new format documents were issued in relatively small numbers during 1958 as replacements for lost or damaged documents and as original issue documents to those reaching their 16th birthday. It is certain, however, that old format documents were still used for these purposes in at least one megye or county as late as March 1959. As late as 3 October 1959, NEPSZABADSAG, one of the two principal daily Budapest newspapers carried an announcement by the National Police Headquarters of the Ministry of Interior to the effect that identity documents which were to expire in 1959 would become invalid on 30 November 1959. Those who had not yet exchanged their expiring identity documents were instructed to report to their police headquarters immediately.

2/3. The original/

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3. The original mass issuance of identity documents for persons 16 years of age and older took place in Hungary in 1954 and 1955. At that time all documents had a validity of 5 years only. Subsequently, in June 1956, a regulation changed this as to persons over 30 years of age. Under the new law, documents of persons from age 30 to 50 were given a validity period of 10 years and those of persons over 50 were to have indefinite validity. This new regulation was given effect during the revalidation campaign following the October 1956 revolution when all Szemelyi Igazolvany had to be presented to police authorities within a given time. Revalidation came in the form of a reddish stamp pasted on the inside back cover of every basic identity document. The only information entered on this stamp was the terminal validity date of the document. For those under 30 the validity date on the stamp was the same as that originally indicated in the document; for those between 30 and 50 the stamp showed a terminal validity date exactly 5 years later than that originally entered in the document and for those over 50 the word indefinite was entered on the stamp. Documents issued after the revalidation campaign did not get revalidation stamps.

4. Large scale issue of the new format identity documents probably started in some areas early in 1959 when, according to newspaper and radio announcements, all persons in possession of documents which were to expire during the 1959 year were required to exchange them starting 2 January 1959. These announcements outlined the procedure for the exchange and included a statement on the manner in which inhabitants would be notified as to the time when they were to apply to their local police headquarters for their new identity documents.

5. In line with the above, basic identity documents of the large majority of those between the ages of 21 to 36 have or will have their documents exchanged during 1959 or 1960. This could easily create the general impression that people under 40 have been issued the new format document.

6. On the other hand, information available to this unit leads us to believe that so far, unexpired documents of the old format have not been exchanged for the new documents unless:

- a. their validity period expired or will expire some time during 1959 or 1960
- b. the originally issued document had to be replaced because of its loss or damaged condition
- c. the name of the bearer has changed through marriage or otherwise
- d. an error has been noted or discovered in the bearer's document

7. The discrepancy noted in the documentary cover material provided for the Source's April IBC mission to Hungary has been previously discussed with 66th MI Group personnel in Munich. In and of themselves the documents were not in error but it is a fact that the entry pertaining to military service did not correspond with material in the document legend.

FOR THE UNIT CHIEF:

Charles Yeich Jr.
Charles Yeich Jr.

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DISPOSITION FORM

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION (if any)

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FILE NO.

AEUC-LF

SUBJECT

13066

TO Commanding Officer
66th MI Group,
APO 154, US Forces
ATTN: AEUC-OCB(B)
THRU: AEUC-OCB

FROM Liaison Officer
66th MI Group
Coll & CE Branch
513th MI Group
APO 757, US Forces

DATE 10 June 60
Sankey/8417

COMMENT NO. 1

1. Reference electrical message Z-2661, from your Headquarters, dated 1 June 1960, subject as above.

2. In accordance with paragraph 5 above referenced message, inclosed herewith for your information are comments from the Special Publications Detachment concerning Hungarian Identity Documents.

3. If additional data or a personal briefing of interested personnel is desired, SPD would be agreeable to sending their Chief, Hungarian Document Section, to Stuttgart for that purpose.

for V. Sankey
66th MI Group LNO
HQ USACUE
APO 757, US FORCES

*copy given OCE(B) for 13066 decision.
sent FS I & IV.*

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DD FORM 1 FEB 50 96

REPLACES NME FORM 86, 1 OCT 48, WHICH MAY BE USED.

AGL (1) 8-55-57002M-57002

Freedom of Information Act/Privacy Act
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Indicated below are one or more statements which provide a brief rationale for the deletion of this page.

- ☐ Information has been withheld in its entirety in accordance with the following exemption(s):

It is not reasonable to segregate meaningful portions of the record for release.

- ☐ Information pertains solely to another individual with no reference to you and/or the subject of your request.

- ☒ Information originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.

- ☐ Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of the information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
UNITED STATES ARMY INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY COMMAND
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION/PRIVACY OFFICE
FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755-5995

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF:

October 1, 2002

Freedom of Information/
Privacy Office

Mr. John Young
CRYPTOME
251 West 89th Street
Suite 6E
New York, New York 10024

Dear Mr. Young:

References:

- a. Your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request of March 29, 2001, for records concerning various dossiers. Your request was received in this office on April 18, 2001.
- b. Our letter of May 2, 2001, providing you the requested records, pertaining to Hungary Operational Activities (FOIA #634F-01).

As noted in our letter, we were coordinating with another government agency concerning the releasability of their information contained in the records.

Coordination has been completed with an agency and a record has been returned to this office for our review and direct response to you.

We have completed a mandatory declassification review in accordance with Executive Order (EO) 12958. As a result of this review, one page of information has been denied in its entirety, as it is currently and properly classified SECRET according to Sections 1.3 (a) (2) and 1.5 (c) of EO 12958. This information is exempt from the public disclosure provisions of the FOIA pursuant to Title 5 U.S. Code 552 (b) (1). It is not possible to reasonably segregate meaningful portions of the withheld page for release. On March 9, 1999, the President exempted the files series in which these records are maintained from the automatic declassification provisions of EO 12958, Section 3.4, pertaining to classified records more than 25 years old. A brief explanation of the applicable sections follows:

Section 1.3 (a) (2) of EO 12958 provides that information shall be classified SECRET if its unauthorized disclosure reasonably could be expected to cause serious damage to the national security.

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b1, b7C, b7D

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- ☐ Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of the information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.

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